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EFFICIENCY OF THE WELFARE STATE: 
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--------
Jekabs Bikis, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Dallas, 2011 
Supervising Professor: Brian J. L. Berry 
As governments continue to evolve over the past century or so in their perceived role of 
providing economic security for their populations, a ubiquitous yet ill-defined concept of the 
welfare state is increasingly taking center stage in political and economic debates. With fiscal 
crises looming over the horizon in many parts of the world, the fingers of blame point with 
greater frequency to the welfare state as the entity which is contributing more to fiscal problems 
than to economic solutions. Reformation of the welfare state is rapidly becoming more likely and 
more urgent and this study proposes one mechanism for evaluating welfare state performance 
and setting benchmarks for optimizing such performance. The study uses Data Envelopment 
Analysis to evaluate comparative efficiencies of various welfare state models in 137 countries, 
and to propose potential pathways to efficiency savings in the laggard efficiency states. The 
study contextualizes the welfare state efficiency differences by referring to the well-established 
welfare state typologies of 18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
v 
(OECD) countries. The results are consistent with previous findings in identifying the lower 
spending states as generally more efficient and finding the social-democratic welfare state model 
less efficient. The results are qualified by the recognition that definitional and data availability 
issues remain to be solved by future studies, as many of the ideal variables for welfare state 
performance measurement do not exist at this time. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: IMPORTANCE OF EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT IN WELFARE 
STATE STUDIES 
This study examines the efficiency with which welfare states manage to reach their stated 
goals. By scrutinizing the relationship between inputs and outputs of the welfare state on a 
comparative basis the study identifies the more successful welfare state variants as it crafts 
policy recommendations for leaner, more efficient welfare states of the future. 
The welfare state of the twenty first century is a framework of policies, programs, and 
institutions partially designed and partially evolved to address the perceived needs of individuals 
and societies. As an embodiment of the belief that the state ought to provide a safety net to its 
citizenry in actual or potential need, the welfare state has been looked upon to provide services 
such as health care or education, or even to redistribute incomes in some 'equitable' manner. 
Financed by tax revenue or borrowed funds, the state plays this role by attempting to reach pre-
set but evolving goals in education, health provision, income redistribution and income 
replacement in sickness, unemployment, or retirement. As in any arrangement where inputs and 
outputs of a process are considered, variability of the process efficiency implies a related 
variability of outcome achievement. 
1.1 Welfare state efficiency: unanswered questions in an important field 
The efficiency of the welfare state is of particular interest because of the magnitude of the 
tax burden it requires and the perceived importance of the services it provides to the voting 
citizenry. The burden of supporting the welfare state has tended to rise during much of the 
twentieth century and where taxes have been insufficient to finance spending, borrowing has 
supplemented revenue. Consequentially, tax burdens in many nations have risen and debt levels 
have grown to worrisome levels. (see Figure 1.1) With high debt levels particularly hard to 
accept in the post "Great Recession" era and with an unprecedented share of government 
spending going to welfare-state-associated expenditures, the question of welfare state efficiency 
is continuing to gain urgency (see, for example, efficiency discussion in Sapir 2006). Are states 
efficient in providing program outputs to their constituents, or can efficiency improvements be 
attained? (Gonand, Joumard and Price 2007) 
Government Spending as percentage of GOP· fewer countries 
(pre·war/postwar numbers on ly, excluding wartime) 
191~ 192:1 19)7 !HiJ 19E :J 
f rtl't'!' 
Figure 1.1. Government Spending as percentage of GDP, 1870- 2009 
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1.2 How well we are doing? The value of understanding efficiency 
Where welfare state inefficiencies are found to exist, two types of adjustments can 
potentially be made: welfare state outputs can be provided by consuming less inputs than before 
(input focused efficiency improvement), or-alternatively-more welfare state output can be 
provided for the same level of spending (output focused efficiency improvement). The first 
adjustment eliminates avoidable input waste while the second leads to realization of previously 
unrealized output potential. (Ray 2004) Either of these approaches increases welfare of citizens 
while also enhancing the standing of policymakers in the eyes of the voting public. Additionally 
and most importantly the moral case for improved efficiency is hard to ignore where taxpayers 
are asked to shoulder the burden of program funding. 
3 
With a goal of identifying the most efficient welfare state regimes (in individual nations) or 
types of welfare states (groupings along geographical lines or feature-driven lines), this study 
proceeds by discussing efficiency measurement concepts, identifying approaches for measuring 
efficiency of a welfare state, utilizing four specifications of a welfare state efficiency model 
using Data Envelopment Analysis and finally discussing the results and proposing directions for 
fUrther research. 
CHAPTER2 
THE CONCEPT OF EFFICIENCY 
Researchers and practitioners in multiple fields have sought to understand and measure 
efficiency in order to improve operations. Efficiency has been studied in such fields as 
operations research, productivity studies in business, applied economics, management and 
computer science. 1 With the evolution of Data Envelopment Analysis as a methodology for 
studying efficiencies over the past half century or so it has become possible to study efficiencies 
ofless traditional 'production' processes, such as presidential campaigns in the US (Berry and 
Chen 1999), smallholder maize producers in Kenya (Mulwa, Emrouznejad and Muhammad 
2009), or neonatal care units in Scottland (Field and Emrouznejad 2003). 
2.1 Efficiency- converting inputs into outputs 
In a general sense, efficiency describes the relationship between inputs and outputs. When 
several units use the same amount of inputs to produce differing amounts of output, then the one 
producing more is said to be more efficient in terms of output-focused efficiency. When several 
units produce the same amount of output using differing amount of inputs, then the one 
1 The particular fields of research are mentioned here due to availability of DEA articles in the 
field journals, such as European Journal of Operational Research (373 DEA articles), Journal of 
Productivity Analysis (242 DEA articles), Applied Economics (86 DEA articles), Management 
Science (83 DEA articles), and Computer and Operations Research (48 DEA articles). Data from 
Emrouznejad (Emrouznejad, Parker and Tavares 2008) 
4 
consuming less input is said to be more efficient in terms of input-focused efficiency. (Sengupta 
2000) 
2.1.1 Farrell's breakthrough in process efficiency measurement 
Operational efficiency in the modern sense was discussed effectively by Farrell, who 
identified these two general categories of(in)efficiency. (Farrelll957) Both types of 
(in)efficiency can be demonstrated by examining production possibilities of a hypothetical 
productive agent in a two-input/one-output model, following Farrell's original paper. As Figure 
2.1 illustrates, one unit of output (indicated by the unit isoquant YY') can be produced by 
combining inputs X, and X2. An agent producing one unit of output using input bundle P is 
inefficient, since the same output could be produced by using the lesser input bundle R. 
Technical efficiency (TE) is calculated as OR/OP, which is less than one in the present example, 
indicating the presence of inefficiency. The given producer is additionally inefficient because of 
the subobtimality of the input ratio used in production. The lowest cost way to reach one unit of 
output is to use input bundle T, which costs the same as bundleS. Such a bundle would cost less 
than Rand clearly less than P. Input-focused allocative efficiency (AEf is thus seen as OS/OR, 
which again is less than one, indicating an imperfect efficiency. In this approach, each 
producer's performance is compared to a frontier of efficient performances (theoretical or 
factual) to determine the amount of inefficiency present. 
2 This (in)efficiency was called 'price inefficiency' by Farrell (Farrell 1957) 
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Figure 2.1. Technical and Allocative Inefficiencies3 
2.2 Efficiency in social sciences 
It is quite a bit more difficult to define and measure efficiency in social sciences than it is 
in many manufacturing processes. Researchers in the social sciences must be able to define the 
goals of a particular process and identify the inputs and outputs of that process. After goals, 
inputs and outputs are identified, they must be measured, which again is often difficult. Still, 
despite the difficulties, the need to understand efficiency is as great in social sciences as in other 
fields. 
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"The problem of measuring the productive efficiency of an industry is important to both the 
economic theorist and the economic policy maker. If the theoretical arguments as to the 
relative efficiency of different economic systems are to be subjected to empirical testing, it 
3 Source: Example from Farrell (Farrelll957); graphic from Herrera (Herrera and Pang 2005) 
is essential to be able to make some actual measurements of efficiency. Equally, if 
economic planning is to concern itself with particular industries, it is important to know 
how far a given industry can be expected to increase its output by simply increasing its 
efficiency, without absorbing further resources." (Farre111957) 
2.3 Efficiency in political economy 
While the benefits of defining and utilizing a concept of efficiency in the social sciences 
are quite well understood, a theoretical and practical move from definition to measurement has 
proved elusive in many important topics, including the topic of welfare state studies. There are 
some uses of one-dimensional efficiency measures in political economy, where indicators or 
ratios are used as proxies for process efficiency. For example, efficiency of the welfare state 
might be measured by simply looking at the rate of poverty, or rate of employment in a nation. 
Research in multi-dimensional welfare state efficiency, on the other hand, is relatively 
sparse. Inhibiting this theoretically appealing path are difficulties associated with gathering the 
necessary data in a comparative fashion, finding theoretical agreement about the major goals of 
the welfare state and perhaps dealing with the relative novelty of non-parametric efficiency 
measurement tools as applied to welfare state issues. 
Another complicating factor preventing researchers from fully engaging with the topic of 
welfare state efficiency has been the fact that the performance of a welfare state is driven not 
only by the efficiency of input conversion into outputs, but also by other factors, such as 
"institutional settings, structural framework conditions, or ... country-specific features." (Mandl, 
7 
8 
Dierx and Ilzkovitz 2008) Despite such difficulties, pressure continues to build on policy-makers 
and researchers to understand and improve process efficiency for the welfare state policies and 
institutions. 
2.4 Efficiency vis-a-vis frontier - parametric and nonparametric approaches 
In order to estimate welfare state efficiency, performance needs to be compared against a 
theoretical understanding of what is possible. Such an understanding can be quantified in a 
simple number or in a frontier of possible efficient outcomes. If a frontier is used, then it needs to 
be established based on theory (parametric approaches) or on observations (nonparametric 
approaches). Parametric approaches require a specification of a functional form to define "what 
is possible and what is efficient". Nonparametric measures use observed best-practice 
performance of the most efficient states to do the same. 
2.4.1 Parametric Approaches: Corrected Ordinary Least Squares, Stochastic 
frontier function 
Theoretical efficient frontiers can be estimated using corrected ordinary least squares 
(COLS) as discussed by Winsten (Winsten 1957) or several forms of stochastic frontier functions 
described by Aigner (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(Meeusen and van den Broeck 1977). 
In COLS, the theoretical efficient frontier is estimated by calculating an average (OLS) 
relationship between the inputs and outputs, then shifting the regression line so that it passes 
through the "most efficient" data point(s). The rest of the points, lying below the upshifted 
9 
regression line, are considered inefficient, the extent of their inefficiency calculable in relation to 
the hypothetically feasible maximum output reflected by the efficient frontier. (Winsten 1957) 
Stochastic frontier function approach is similar to COLS but in this approach it is assumed 
that the error term is composed of two parts: a random error component and a technical 
inefficiency component (either time-specific or time-invariant). This approach requires 
additional strong distributional assumptions regarding country-specific inefficiency components. 
Fixed-effects methodologies can be incorporated with the stochastic frontier estimations to make 
the production frontiers country-specific. (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 1977) 
An advantage of estimating efficiencies using parametric approaches is that standard 
statistical tests can be used to establish the significance level of the results. However, there are 
important disadvantages which make the selection of parametric methods inappropriate for the 
current research. Use of CO LS leads to the observed data not being bound closely by the 
efficient frontier, especially further away from the 'definitionally efficient' region. In the 
presence ofheteroskedasticity some inefficiency scores will be excessively high when COLS is 
used for inefficiency estimation. An even more important disadvantage of both COLS and 
stochastic frontier approaches is the difficulty in estimating efficiencies in presence of multiple 
outputs.4 This difficulty can be overcome if multiple outputs can be aggregated into a single 
output used for efficiency measurement (see Gupta and Verhoeven 2001, for example). Evans 
and Tandon offer a more detailed concise description of the parametric methods (Evans, et al. 
2001). 
4 Some methods have been developed to allow multiple-output efficiency comparisons (see 
Bauer 1990, for example), but they have not found wide use in practice. 
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2.4.2 Nonparametric approaches: Free Disposal Hull and Data Envelopment 
Analysis 
When using nonparametric approaches no attempt is made to estimate a theoretically 
feasible functional form of the efficient frontier. Instead, the efficient frontier is derived directly 
from an array of observed data points. Once the frontier is established, relative efficiencies can 
be estimated for all other data points. Free Disposal Hull (FDH) and Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) are two of the commonly used nonparametric methods used for efficiency analyses. 
Free Disposal Hull (FDH) imposes the least a priori assumptions on the production 
technology based on the observed data. Using FDH a producer is considered relatively inefficient 
in comparison with another if it uses more input to produce the same (or less) output, or if it uses 
the same (or more) input to produce less output. Simply, FDH establishes a frontier using only 
the best practices observations (without assuming that the unobserved input-output combinations 
are possible as combinations of the actual observations) subsequently calculating the inefficiency 
of all producers inside the frontier (Tulkens 1993). Since the convexity of the production 
possibilities set is not assumed in FDH, the only necessary assumption is the free disposability of 
resources (i.e if a worker made 10 bowls from 10 pieces of clay, then surely another worker 
could make at least 10 bowls from 12 pieces of clay as long as assuming that it is costless to 
dispose of the extra 2 pieces of clay should they go unused). 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is an observations-based nonparametric method used to 
calculate comparative efficiencies of decision making units using multiple inputs to produce 
multiple outputs. The use ofDEA has grown in acceptance (see Figure 2.2) because "measuring 
efficiency and productivity of large organizations is a non-trivial exercise, involving a complex 
11 
multi-input/output structure" and "DEA technology, by design, naturally accounts for such issues 
efficiently and effectively." (Ernrouznejad, Parker and Tavares 2008) 
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Figure 2.2. Publications utilizing DEA methodology5 
2.5 Data Envelopment Analysis - introduction to methodology 
As an example of how DEA its used, consider efficiencies of similar factories which can be 
compared by accounting for each factory 's inputs (say, workers, capital, raw materials) and 
outputs (such as the number of cars, number of trucks and perhaps some measure of quality, such 
as warranty claims or defect rates). A production frontier would be fit over the existing data, 
defined according to the efficiency leaders in the various input-output combinations. 
Subsequently efficiency slacks would be calculated for laggards as the relative distances of the 
datapoints from the frontier. DEA is conceptualized in a straightforward way in either the one-
5 Source: Evaluation of research in efficiency (Ernrouznejad, Parker and Tavares 2008) 
input/one-output case where quantities of input and output vary, or in a two-input/one-output 
case, where quantities of inputs vary. 
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Where one input is used to produce one output, DEA requires first that the existing input-
output combinations are observed and noted. The observed datapoints are then enveloped by an 
estimated set of "most efficient" feasible linear input-output combinations. The envelope of the 
"most efficient" combinations is comprised of actually observed datapoints with the highest 
output/input ratios, which are then connected with linear segments, implying theoretically 
achievable multiples of inputs and outputs. 
F 
Output 
·y 
0 X In put 
Figure 2.3. Example of efficiency estimates using DEA 6 
6 Source: Efficiency of Public Spending in Developing Countries (Herrera and Pang 2005) 
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2.5.1 Returns to scale assumptions in DEA 
Following Coelli, the actual envelopment may vary with the returns to scale assumptions as 
illustrated in the Figure 2.3 above (Coelli, Lefebvre and Pestieau 2008). In the illustrative 
example, if constant returns to scale are assumed, then only one productive agent (A) may be 
considered efficient. D is inefficient if we assume that D should be able to scale inputs 
proportionally to A in order to reach D.' 
Assuming that returns to scale can vary in the example, the entire frontier XADF would 
become the efficient frontier against which the performance of productive agents could be 
compared. D would now be efficient, since there is no other observation (or linear combination 
of observations) producing more with the same inputs or producing the same output with less 
inputs. Cis inefficient, since V (a linear combination of bundles A and D) could produce the 
same output as C using less input. C's technical (in)efficiency is calculated as TE==YV/YC. For 
some applications, as shown by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
1978) and by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (Banker, Charnes and Cooper 1984) it maybe useful 
to disentangle C's scale inefficiency from C's technical inefficiency, with the former calculated 
as YN/YV and the latter as YV/YC. Scale inefficiency shows what C should be able to produce 
if it could be expected to abide by globally constant returns to scale based on A's productivity, 
while technical efficiency shows what C should be able to produce assuming globally varying 
returns to scale, constant only between observed bundles A and D. 
2.5.2 Aggregate inputs and aggregate outputs in DEA 
Mathematically, DEA is based on applications oflinear programming. In the most basic 
conception, efficiency in DEA is calculated as (the weighted) input divided by (the weighted) 
output. Following Ramanathan (Ramanathan 2003): 
Output 
Efficiency = ---
Input 
14 
Where multiple inputs are used, the 'input' measure is just linear aggregation of all inputs: 
I 
Aggregate (virtual)input = I uixi 
i=l 
Similarly, where multiple outputs are used, the 'output' measure is an aggregate: 
J 
Aggregate (virtual)output =I ViYi 
j=l 
ui and Vi are nonzero positive weights assigned to each input and each output respectively. 
Efficiency in multiple input, multiple output scenarios then becomes: 
The issue of assigning weights to each DMU's inputs and outputs is essentially the crux of 
the issue addressed by DEA. A welfare state which does very well with poverty reduction will be 
shown to have high efficiency if high weight is assigned to some poverty measure, but it may 
score low in efficiency if poverty measures are given a low weight. The weight selection 
problem is addressed in DEA by using mathematical programming rather than arbitrary weight 
selection. The method determines the optimal weights for each DMU; weights which generate 
the highest possible efficiency subject to the constraint of keeping other DMU efficiencies 
between 0 and 1. 
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CHAPTER3 
EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT IN PRACTICE 
Existing research in the area of multi-dimensional welfare state efficiency is still in its 
infancy. Researchers are beginning to use non-parametric methods to at least consider the 
question of efficiency in regards to a welfare state (see Table 3.1 ). Most of the existing efforts 
evaluate sub-sections of a welfare state (health services, education systems, etc.), however, and 
not the "welfare state" as a whole. 
Table 3 .1. Selected public sector efficiency studies 
Subject Authorship n= 
---' 
Time Inputs or Outputs or Method 
Study DMUs period Independent Dependent Variable Employed 
Variable 
Social Coelli, 15 EU 12 years "one unit" of Poverty (after- DEAwith 
Protection Lefebvre, nations (1995- government transfer at-risk-of- index 
efficiency Pestieau, 2006) foreachDMU poverty rate) variable as 
and 2009 Inequality (top output 
Convergence quintile/bottom 
inEU quintile ratio for 
income earners) 
Unemployment (long 
term unemployed 
share of population) 
Education (early 
schoolleavers' share 
of 18-24 year olds) 
Health (life 
expectancy at birth) 
Welfare Gouyette, 13 1 year Social Poverty Efficient 
state Pestieau, countries Spending share Inequality Frontier 
efficiency 1999 ofGDP and 
regression 
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Table 3.1 Continued 
Subject Authorship n= 
-----> Time Inputs or Outputs or Method 
Study DMUs period Independent Dependent Variable Employed 
Variable 
Government Gupta, 37 12 years Education life expectancy, FDH 
expenditure Verhoeven, countries (1984- spending (per infant mortality, 
efficiency in 1999 in Mrica 1995), capita, PPP) immunizations, 
Africa (appendix data Health primary/ secondary 
for 85 averaged spending (per enrollments, adult 
total over capita, PPP) literacy 
countries) three- or 
six-year 
periods 
Education Afonso, St. 24 I year Intended PISA scores for FDHand 
and Health Aubyn, countries instruction reading, math, DEA 
inOECD 2004 time in public science 
schools, Infant mortality, life 
teachers per expectancy 
student, 
doctors, 
nurses, hosp. 
beds per 
capita 
Public Afonso, 23 End Public Composite of indices FDH 
sector Tanzi, 2003 countries points or spending for corruption, red 
efficiency averages share ofGDP tape, quality of 
for an 11 judiciary, size of 
year shadow economy; 
period enrollments, 
1990- educational 
2000 attainment, infant 
mortality, life 
expectancy, 
infrastructure quality, 
economic variables 
• doubly 
indexed into 
a composite 
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3.1 Welfare state defined 
What is a welfare state and what are its goals? Friedrich von Hayek has written that "the 
conception of the welfare state has no precise meaning. The phrase is sometimes used to describe 
any state that 'concerns' itself in any manner with problems other than those of maintenance of 
law and order." (Hayek 1959) An author of a noted welfare state classification Gosta Esping-
Andersen cites a similarly general definition of the welfare state as a state that "involves state 
responsibility for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens." (Esping-Andersen 
1990). Such general definitions are hardly helpful in allowing one to identify inputs and outputs 
of a process through which goals are reached. 
In contrast to Hayek and Esping-Andersen, others have attempted extraordinarily detailed 
definitions. Asa Briggs for example defined the welfare state in great detail: 
"[a welfare state is] a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through 
politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least 
three directions - first, by guaranteeing individuals and families minimum income 
irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second, by narrowing 
the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain 'social 
contingencies' (for example, sickness, old age and unemployment) which lead 
otherwise to individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all citizens without 
distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a 
certain agreed range of social services." (Briggs 1961) 
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Driven by necessity for sufficient detail that would allow goal identification and 
performance measurement, the present study defines a welfare state as a framework of policies, 
programs and institutions created to provide a safety net or services in health care, education and 
various forms of income replacement. The welfare state is financed through taxation or 
borrowing in the short run; taxation only in the long run. 
3.2 Inputs and outputs in existing welfare state efficiency literature 
Once the welfare state has been successfully defined, measuring its efficiency requires 
identification of a certain set of measurable inputs and outputs. In very general terms, the welfare 
state transforms inputs (such as tax revenue or percentages of government budgets) into outputs 
(such as better health and education, reduced poverty and increased income replacement for the 
unemployed or the retired). Since the inputs and outputs are neither necessarily self-evident nor 
equal for all types of welfare states, then the selection of these variables can vary from study to 
study depending on the particular research hypothesis and the researcher's general framework of 
welfare state understanding. 
3.2.1 Commonly used inputs 
One approach to input identification in welfare state studies is to explicitly reject particular 
inputs that may be used to accomplish the goals of a welfare state. Pestieau, for instance, argues 
that when the welfare state is examined as a whole, then inputs should not be considered and the 
efficiencies should be estimated on outputs alone. (Pestieau 2009) He recommends using a 
standard "one government" as the sole input for every welfare state. Policies and institutions 
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differ so greatly from one nation to another that the standardized, equal input approach is the 
only tenable solution in his view. Pestieau's argument rests on the sober acknowledgement that 
input selection for welfare states is difficult and researchers risk introducing bias in selecting 
those input variables which help them reach favorable conclusions. 
Others use some measures of social spending to explain the varied outcomes of the welfare 
state effort. Coelli uses social spending as a percentage ofGDP from the Eurostat database, 
while Afonso uses the even broader total public expenditure share of GDP; both assume that 
higher social spending should bring about increased better achievement of welfare state 
outcomes, other things being equal. (Coelli, et al, 2010; Afonso, et al, 2005, 2006) Spending 
measures are frequently favored for inputs in welfare state processes because government 
spending data is available for a large number of countries and for most purposes, data is quite 
comparable from country to country. 
Still, it is true that variables other than social spending affect health performance and 
longevity (overall improvements in medical technology, family support, cultural values, etc.) 
which is why some authors prefer supplementing spending measures with other types of input 
effort measures. Gupta and Veerhoeven, for example, estimate the per capita education and 
health spending undertaken by each government he reviews (Gupta and Veerhoven, 2001) The 
authors recognize that equal nominal spending per capita may buy vastly different amounts of 
health or educational services in various states, so the amounts are expressed in terms of their 
purchasing power parity. 
Some researchers abandon exchange rate adjsuted expenditure amounts because of the 
difficulty of differing cross-country costs for welfare state services and settle instead on physical 
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input variables such as average class size or ratio of students to teaching staff, number of 
instruction hours, or availability of computers, when efficiency in education is estimated 
(Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2005) or the count of doctors, nurses and beds when efficiency in health 
care is estimated. (Ibid) 
Even when social spending is used to measure the inputs of the welfare state, the use of 
these time-dependent variables is not uniform across existing research. Since taking any given 
year's social spending would result in a snapshot which may or may not be representative of the 
general characteristics of a nation's social spending, some authors average the social spending 
across a set of years. Gouyette and Pestieau use the mean social spending for years 1992 
through 1994 as the input for each welfare state. (Gouyette and Pestieau, 1999) Yet other studies 
break social spending amounts down into three year averages and use these averages as inputs 
for the welfare state. (Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001) This allows researchers to get further away 
from the potential one-year anomaly to note trends over time. 
When researchers consider "social spending"7 as a key input, as do Gouyette and Pestieau 
(1999), Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) and others, there was still an open issue of whether "social 
spending" should have been included nominally or adjusted to the demographic characteristics of 
recipient population, as Scruggs recommends (Scruggs 2008). The rationale is that a country 
with twice the net population weight of youth under 15 would be expected to spend twice as 
much on education as the comparison nation. 
7 By "social spending" in this case I refer to the estimates of government spending on social 
programs as percentage of GDP 
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3.2.2 Commonly used outputs 
Output variables are similarly difficult to establish. While it is clear that states seek to, for 
example, improve health outcomes or unemployment security of their populations, what exactly 
constitutes a measure of a health outcome? The approaches vary, with some taking life 
expectancy as their proxy for health outcomes (Coelli, Lefebvre and Pestieau 2008) while others 
consider variables such as immunization percentages for particular diseases (Evans, Tandon, 
Murray and Lauer 2001). 
Similar choices among potential output variables takes place in the other dimensions of the 
welfare state- education, poverty prevention, income replacement. General efforts have been 
made to measure the extent to which welfare states are able to reach their goals. For a review and 
a few (of many) examples see "Public Sector Efficiency: An International Comparison" by 
Afonso et al. (Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi 2003) 
3.2.2.1 Standalone outputs vs. composite (index) outputs 
After the appropriate output indicators have been chosen, researchers also face a choice in 
the way outputs are used. Some treat multiple outputs as equally important welfare state outputs, 
while others combine multiple outputs in some type of an output index. For example, Coelli and 
coauthors use a composite of five variables to estimate the efficiency of the welfare state: at-
risk-of-poverty rate, inequality measure, long term unemployed, early schoolleavers and life 
expectancy, and instead of comparing the states in achieving success in each of these variables, 
the authors construct an 'aggregate social protection index.' (Coelli, et al, 201 0) At-risk-of-
poverty is estimated as the percentage of people who are below 60% of the nation's disposable 
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income, after transfers are considered. 8 The inequality measure here is defined as the ratio of the 
total income received by the top 20% of income earners versus the total income received by the 
bottom 80% of income earners. Unemployment is defined as the percentage of the total 
workforce that has been unemployed for 12 months or more. Education is defined as the 
percentage of 18-24 year olds with at most a lower secondary education and life expectancy is 
defined as the number of years that a person can be expected to live at birth. Afonso and his co-
authors similarly use a composite indicator as a proxy for welfare state performance output 
indicator. (Afonso, et al, 2005) They combine seven major measures into an aggregate 'public 
sector performance indicator' -administrative state performance (including measures for 
corruption, red tape, judiciary quality, shadow economy), education (secondary enrollment, 
achievement), health (Infant mortality, life expectancy), infrastructure (communications and 
transport), inequality (income share of 40% poorest households), economic stability (GDP and 
inflation stability) and economic perfonnance (GDP per capita, GDP growth, unemployment.) 
Such a composite approach allows the researchers to include multiple output variables, even if 
indirectly, without needing to increase the viable sample size for efficiency frontier use. The 
weakness of aggregating the output variables may be the fact that the strengths and weaknesses 
of various sub-indicators offset each other in such a way that the aggregates come out too similar 
for countries that are in reality quite different. 
Other writers (Gouyette and Pestieau, 1999; Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001) limit the outputs 
of the welfare state to inequality (Gini coefficient at a particular point in time) and poverty 
8 Ideally any usage of a relative poverty measure would be supplemented by, or combined with, 
some type of absolute poverty measure, since even if the relative poverty fell with absolute 
poverty rising, then this would hardly constitute success for the welfare state. 
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(percentage of population at 50% of median income), or isolate one of the functions of the 
welfare state, such as health care (Evans, et al, 2000) or education, or both. (Ravallion, 2003; 
Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2005) Afonso and St. Aubyn estimate separate efficiency models, first 
using PISA literacy scales in reading, mathematics and science as outputs for efficiency in 
educational services and then using infant survival and life expectancy as outputs for efficiency 
in health services. (Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2005) 
3.3 Sample - nations studied in existing welfare state efficiency literature 
Most of the comparative welfare state literature is devoted to investigations of a similar 
group of major OECD countries, dominated by western European democracies. Some studies 
limit themselves to as few as twelve or thirteen European nations (Gouyette and Pestieau, 1999) 
including the US for reference, others expand the set to the more recent EU entrants (Coelli, et 
al, 201 0), while yet others take account of most of the worlds' nations, employing a looser 
definition of the welfare state. (Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001; Evans, et al, 2000) 
3.4 Survey of methodology and some results from the existing welfare state efficiency 
literature 
Although the existing welfare state efficiency literature is not very deep, a handful of 
different approaches have attempted to measure the relevant variables. Gupta, for example, uses 
FDH with a single input and single output to compare welfare state efficiencies for particular 
years over a multi-year period. He observes that over time African nations rank lower in welfare 
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state efficiency than do Asian or Western Hemisphere countries, but finds that this differential is 
diminishing over time. (Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001) 
Afonso and St. Aubyn use both FDH and DEA to compare efficiencies in health services 
and educational attainment (Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2005). They differ from the other studies by 
their purposeful selection of some non-monetary input variables (number of hospital beds instead 
of dollars spent on health care.) The strength of such study is the ability to get away from 
exchange rate or cost of services implications, which may distort cross-country comparisons. 
Since FDH and DEA studies comparing state performance risk identifying too many 
'efficient states' when they use multiple output indicators, then it is worth noting the 
methodologies of Afonso and Coelli who use aggregated output indicators. (Afonso, et al, 2005; 
Coelli, 201 0) This approach allows the researchers to operationalize a more complete concept of 
'the welfare state' while still avoiding the potential problem of too many independently perfectly 
efficient Decision Making Units (governments in charge of their welfare states). By relying on 
composite (index) variables, Afonso and his coauthors identify only 3 of23 countries as efficient 
-a rather good result for efficiency frontier analysis with a small sample size. 
Several authors employ parametric methods to estimate the efficient frontiers. Evans, for 
example, estimates efficiencies of state healthcare systems, and to do this he creates a fixed 
effects panel for a large number of countries. (Evans, et al, 201 0) 
3.5 Advantages and disadvantages of existing approaches 
The diverse foci of the existing studies give evidence to the theoretical difficulty of, first, 
defining 'the welfare state' and, second, measuring its performance. To increase the ease of 
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measurability and data collection some researchers have defined the welfare state (perhaps too) 
narrowly. They have focused on 'education' and 'health' outcomes as proxies of the overall 
welfare state effort. (Herrera and Pang 2005) What this approach gains in tractability it loses in 
comprehensiveness. Even if one were to show efficiency in health and education, a giant leap 
would be required to call the respective welfare state efficient as a whole. How does this state 
perform with regard to poverty reduction or income replacement? When welfare state is defined 
broadly (including and capturing its various goals), then the result is perhaps a more realistic 
understanding of the workings of this multifaceted framework of policies and institutions, even 
though a such a broadly defined entity is less tractable and more open to theoretical critiques (as 
a comprehensive conception of the welfare state). 
The present study defines the welfare state more broadly, by starting with three inputs and 
six outputs, thus choosing to be aggressive in its definition. The proposed research utilizes Data 
Envelopment Analysis to add feasibility of efficiency measurement for such a broadly defined 
welfare state. 
CHAPTER4 
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS: VARIABLES AND DATA 
Existing research on efficiencies of political economic arrangements is largely related to 
individual programs or features of the welfare state, not to efficiencies of the welfare state as a 
whole. The present study contributes to the understanding and measurement of welfare state 
efficiency by applying the methodology of Data Envelopment Analysis to the analysis of the 
whole system of state provisions of key welfare state components. 
Evaluation of the welfare state as the whole will aid in identifying the areas of greatest 
inefficiencies within the ( dollarwise) massive frameworks of institutions and policies, in addition 
to making efficiency comparisons between different conceptions of welfare states. Much thought 
has been given to classifying types of welfare states and the performance of the various 
categories has been studied. For example, in a widely cited classification Gosta Esping-Andersen 
classified welfare states as liberal, corporatist, or social-democratic (Esping-Andersen 1990) and 
many subsequent researchers have used this classification to see how the each type of state 
performs in reaching its stated goals. Understanding whether efficiency differences exist between 
the various types of welfare state models also enhances the understanding of the classification 
itself. Are the liberal welfare states more efficient than social-democratic ones in that they 
provide proportionally the same income levels of (factual) income replacement per dollar of 
welfare money spent? Are corporatist welfare states less efficient in providing income equality 
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than are liberal ones? Such questions have eluded satisfactory answers until now, but the present 
study will yield answers along precisely these lines. 
4.1 Proposed DEA model 
4.1.1 A focus on reducing inputs, keeping the output level fixed 
As discussed above, DEA permits the investigation into input-focused (allocative) 
efficiency or output-focused (technical) efficiency of a decision making unit. (Sengupta 2000) 
Since one of the intended goals of the present study is to achieve an increase of efficiencies for 
the laggard welfare states, and since the incrementalist and realist approach to policy making 
advises against recommendations for rapid, drastic changes, the present study proposes to focus 
on welfare states' a/locative (input-focused) efficiencies. If the study can show that Waste-a-
stan uses too many resources to produce proportionally the same output as does Lean-a-stan, 
then Waste-a-stan can be encouraged to change some of its welfare program designs so that it 
can keep the existing levels of provisions through spending less (inputs). This would amount to a 
(clandestine?) approach to a de facto welfare state retrenchment in Waste-a-stan. This approach 
is more likely to yield real policy fruit. 
Focus on allocative efficiencies amounts to first identifying the leaders in welfare state 
efficiency (i.e. Lean-a-stan) among the comparison group. DEA then allows for identification of 
'efficiency slacks' along the various dimensions of the welfare state performance. For example, 
ifLean-a-stan spends 5% of its GDP on health expenditures and achieves 1-per-1000 infant 
mortality before age 2, and if Waste-a-stan spends 10% of its GDP on health expenditures, then 
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(assuming constant returns to scale9) Waste-a-stan should be able to reduce its infant mortality to 
0.5-per-1 000. If Waste-a-stan does not show such a comparatively lower mortality rate, then 
DEA will reveal an input focused allocative efficiency slack in this area. When allocative 
efficiency slacks are announced andl compared among nations, regions, or welfare state types, 
then impetus for retrenchment can be generated. 
4.2 Model specification - theo•·etical output variables 
The crux of the issue for this study, and an issue on which the success or failure of the 
study hinges, is the proper identification of the output and input variables for the hard to grasp, 
heterogeneous concept of the 'welfare state'. What are the proper 'outputs of the welfare state? 
Do all welfare states share a similar set of outputs? Is it possible to compare the goals and the 
performance of welfare states? 
In broad strokes, welfare states aim to provide in the areas of education, health care 
(curative and preventative), poverty reduction and/or inequality reduction, and income 
replacement (a broad area subsuming pensions, maternity/paternity leave, and unemployment 
benefits). Figure 4.1 delineates these major dimensions of welfare state effort as understood for 
the purposes of this study, although for some writers a finer level of detail is necessary (Afonso, 
Schuknecht and Tanzi 2003) and other writers include some less traditional welfare state 
performance indicators, such as net migration, social integration, or 'dignity'. (Barr 1992) 
9 This assumption is discussed in more detail in Section and again in model specification Bin 
Section 5.3 
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Figure 4.1. Major dimensions of welfare state effort 
The ideal variables for assessing the performance of the welfare state would be variables 
that in total describe not only each of these performance dimensions but also the welfare state as 
a whole. Much of the existing research dealing with the welfare state evaluates small groups of 
countries (developed nations, European nations, Mediterranean nations, Asian nations, etc.) and 
utilizes some of the Figure 4.2 variables to capture the state's performance. However, not all 
desired variables exist for the broad sample included in this study, so the variables actually used 
are only a subset of the group of ideal variables, as discussed in more detail in subsequent 
sections. 
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Figure 4.2. Ideal output variables for measuring welfare state effort 
The variable selection in this study is constrained by two major factors -variable 
availability for the 13 7 countries in the sample (data availability) and the capabilities of the 
methodology ( overspecification). A careful deliberation in light of the existing research has led 
to selection of two of the most important output variables in each major performance dimension 
as this number of variables allows an evaluation of the welfare state as a whole without 
overspecifying the model beyond the capabilities of the Data Envelopment Analysis 
methodology. Variables (such as life expectancy) are deemed 'important' both if a theoretical 
basis exists for using a variable as a proxy for the performance of the entire dimension (such as 
health), and if multiple existing studies include the variable in their evaluations of a dimension's 
performance. 
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4.2.1 Final output variable selection 
The ftnal output variables used in the study represent a crystallized version of the original 
universe of output variables considered ideal for welfare state performance measurement. 
Table 4.1 . Welfare state output variables and descriptive statistics 
Stan dar 
Media d Max 
Mean n Deviatio Minimu Min Maximu Countr 
value value n m Value Country m Value y 
Total Net 
Enrollment Ratio 
in Primary 
Education 90.12 94.06 11.57 40.00 Liberia 99.99 Japan 
Percentage of 
population under 
ftve without Australi 
stunted growth 81.63 87.00 15.46 47.00 Burundi 100.00 a 
Literate Adults as Norway 
percentage of Burkina (and 
population 82.08 91.00 20.82 24.00 Faso 100.00 others) 
Life Expectancy at Swazilan Iceland, 
birth 67.69 72.00 11.36 40.00 d 82.00 JllQ_an 
Survival rate 
through ftve years Sierra 
per 1 000 live births 944.40 975.00 65.35 730.00 Leone 997.00 Iceland 
Percentage of 
population with Belgiu 
access to improved m(and 
water source 86.46 94.00 16.1 7 38.00 Ethioj>ia 100.00 others) 
4.2.1.1 Outputs - Poverty prevention 
Despite the widely available statistics of the number of people in the world living on less 
than 2 USD per day, no useable measure exists for comparing absolute poverty across borders. 
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Some measures are reported for the developing countries (percentage of population which is 
malnourished, number of people living on less than 1 USD or 2 USD per day, etc.) while other 
absolute measures are reported for the developed countries (percentage of people living under a 
particular income level, defined differently in each country). The fact that poverty data are not 
widely available is a fact that is readily seen in the cross-border development and welfare state 
literatures. (Coelli, et al. 2011) A number of researchers are forthright in their dismay at the fact 
that no truly comparable absolute poverty measure exists. Miriam Sharkh writes in her welfare 
regimes cluster analysis: 
"However, it transpired that there are no accurate measures of poverty for a large 
number of countries for a range of years, even restricting ourselves to the common 
but arbitrary cut-off measure of one dollar per person per day. It is astonishing that 
there is no remotely accurate way of tracking this, the most commonly cited 
Millennium Development Goal!" (Abu Sharkh and Gough 2010) 
It is not that poverty is impossible to measure or to proxy, but the currently available 
variables are simply not ideal. As a proxy for poverty, two measures were used in this study: (1) 
percentage o(population with access to improved water source and (2) presence o(stunting10 
in children under age five. Neither of the variables is a direct measure of poverty, but both can be 
used as approximate proxies for poverty. Countries with higher Gross National Income have 
higher levels of access to improved water sources and lower levels of stunting among children 
under five. 
10 Percentage of children stunted is the percentage of children under five years who have a 
height-for-age below minus two standard deviations of the National Center for Health Statistics 
(NCHS)/WHO reference median. (World Health Organization 2009) 
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Figure 4.3. Access to improved Water Source and Log(GNI) 
Since stunting is a 'negative' outcome of a welfare state (i.e. the poverty-prevention goal of 
the welfare state would be to reduce, not increase, stunting) then data for this study is converted 
to reflect the percentage of children who are five and under who are not stunting. Such 
conversion of 'negative' outcomes is common in the Data Envelopment Analysis research and 
practice and in this case is done simply by subtracting the raw data from 100 percent for each 
country in the sample. 
not_ stunting; = 100 - stunting; 
No such conversion is necessary for the other poverty variable, since increase in the 
percentage of population with access to an improved source of water is consistent with a poverty 
prevention goal of a welfare state. 
Children under five years of stunted 
so 
10 
GOP per capita, countries 
1995-2003 
1 GOO 10000 
Figure 4.4. Stunting and Log GDP per capita 11 
4.2.1.2 Outputs- Education 
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Education variables present a similar although somewhat lesser challenge. The ideal output 
variable for measuring a welfare state's ability to educate its subjects would be a particular test 
which compares knowledge of individuals who start out with equal knowledge and are 
subsequently exposed to different education systems. Subsequent increase in knowledge would 
be compared to provide an indicator for the efficacy of the education system. Clearly, such an 
indicator-variable does not exist. However, various organizations measure student performance, 
school enrollment ratios, even cross-border knowledge tests so that researchers can gain some 
11 Source: World Health Organization (World Health Organization 2011) 
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idea about the level of education by country. Perhaps the most desirable output variable is the 
OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) - a once in three years exam 
currently administered in 61 countries. Since this study evaluates the welfare state efficiency in 
137 countries (see discussion on country selection) the major drawback of this measure is the 
lack of data on student perfonnance in the remaining 76 countries. 
3.C 
:c cc s: 
Figure 4.5. Adult Literacy Rates and Net Enrollment Rates 
This leaves several other potential output variables for inclusion in the study, out of which 
the variables actually included are (3) total net enrollment in primary education, and ( 4) rate of 
literacy among adult populations. These variables are carefully tracked and well reported by 
World Bank and UNICEF respectively. In using these variables this study follows other welfare 
state researchers, such as Gupta and Verhoeven (Gupta and Verhoeven 2001) and Afonso and 
Tanzi (Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi 2003). These researchers also take these two variables as 
approximate proxies for welfare state's educational component's ability to reach its goals. 
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4.2.1.3 Outputs -Health 
Health care is perhaps the area where the greatest abundance of internationally comparable 
indicators exists. From the array of available variables, this research uses (5) life expectancy at 
birth, and (6) 5 and under mortality as indicators of the welfare state's ability to provide health 
outcomes for its constituents. Again, it is not the case that these two measures somehow capture 
the entirety of health outcomes for the affected populations, nor is it the case that nothing else, 
other than the welfare state's policy and practice, affects the two outcome variables (lifestyle, 
culture, diet, genetics also affect both the life expectancy and child mortality). However, the use 
of these two variables has the advantage of data availability and relatively similar definitions for 
measurement, so the variables are included as proxies for health outcomes of the respective 
welfare states. 
Figure 4.6. Life Expectancy and Child Mortality before age 5 (per 1000 live births) 
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4.2.1.4 Outputs- Pensions 
Unfortunately it is not possible to incorporate pension-related data among the output 
variables for the welfare states of the large sample (137 countries) which is the focus of this 
research. Despite the fact that a key output of the welfare state is income replacement in old age, 
sickness, or unemployment, no internationally comparable statistics exist at this time for a large 
pool of countries. The International Monetary Fund keeps a record of International Monetary 
Statistics but this report only covers a select group of (mostly developed) nations. Some welfare 
state researchers include a welfare state output variable such as the IMF's 'social taxes as percent 
ofGDP', 'social spending as percent ofGDP, or 'social spending as percent of total central 
government spending'. However, for the present purposes it is impossible to use a variable where 
more than half of the 13 7 countries under investigation have no comparable basis for evaluating 
the welfare state effort (or achievement) in the area of pensions. Perhaps the current research can 
highlight the need for creation of a new dataset that could track pension coverage or effort for a 
broad group of developed and developing countries, leading to a future opportunity to include 
pensions data in a welfare state efficiency study. 
4.2.2 Final input variable selection 
In order to approximate the inputs of a welfare state, three variables are used; (1) tax 
burden as % of GDP, (2) education spending as % of GDP, and (3) health spending as % of 
GDP. The three input variables, when taken together, provide a proxy for observing the 
resources committed to the welfare state outcomes in general (input variable one) and in 
particular (input variables two and three). 
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When attempting to estimate welfare state effort caution is necessary in variable selection, 
since some variables are potentially superior to others in revealing the extent of resources 
committed to accomplishing the welfare state's goals. To measure the commitment to education 
some researchers rely on the percentage of central government's budget that is used to pay for 
education services, but this approach does not capture large variability in the extent to which the 
central government is involved in the economy. In addition, such an approach does not reveal 
non-government payments toward education or non-central-government payments toward 
education. A country where much education spending is conducted privately or at state or local 
levels would appear as a 'low spending country' and that might not necessarily be an accurate 
portrayal of the true commitments. Similar concerns exist in regard to health spending, which 
can be done privately or publically and which can be done by a large central government or 
small central government. The present research uses the percent ofGDP committed to health and 
education spending respectively as proxies for commitments (inputs) in these welfare state areas. 
In addition to evaluating the commitment to education and health outcomes, the present 
study uses a tax burden as percentage of GDP as a catch-all variable that would include other 
commitments to welfare state policies and institutions (it is true that the tax burden represents 
something much broader than the welfare state input alone; certainly the military expenses, 
infrastructure spending, etc. come out of the tax revenue in many nations). 
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Table 4.2. Welfare state input variables and descriptive statistics 
Stan dar 
Media d Min Max 
Mean n Deviatio Minimu Countr Maximo Countr 
value value n m Value y m Value y 
Public spending on 
health as United 
percentage ofGDP 6.63 6.07 2.65 1.95 Kuwait 15.18 States 
Public spending on 
Education as Sri Timor-
percentage ofGDP 4.51 4.30 2.20 0.98 Lanka 16.80 Leste 
Tax burden as 
percentage ofGDP 22.61 19.20 11.86 1.50 Kuwait 63.10 Lesotho 
4.2.3 Country selection and sample size 
The sample for this study began with a list of all countries and territories as of May 2011, 
and was first narrowed down by population. Following in the footsteps of other researchers, the 
very small countries were eliminated to reduce the probability of very small country outliers the 
results for which would be incomparable to the other countries. Countries with less than one 
million population were excluded from the sample resulting in a sample of 157 countries with 
population one million or greater, plus a few other key countries (such as Luxembourg) which 
did not reach the population cut-off, but were still included in the sample because many other 
studies had included them in their samples. 
Figure 4.7. Countries included in the study 
In the next step, several countries were excluded due to lack of data. Since DEA is a 
nonparametric methodology that is based on a best practice efficient frontier, then it is extremely 
difficult to treat missing observations. Assumptions which are required for filling in the missing 
values reduce the objectivity of the subsequent results. Twenty countries were excluded because 
data needed for this model was not available (see Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3. Countries excluded from sample due to missing data 
Country 
~€~~-
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
•·.Bri~ 
Haiti 
··$· 
Bosnia Herzegovina 
~~Bi~ 
Missing Variable(s} 
.. >tailittt~·.s~~,~-"~\~;·;···. 
Education spen~ing as pe~c~ntag~Gl)P 
lu.l)ur~-~~;.flf.~JJJr·.· ·. 
Tax burden as percentage ofGDP 
·;T:Wt--_.~~~f~.llP. 
Tax burden and education spending as percentage of GDP 
'fax~D~.-.~~i\,~p~ga&J'et~~of'U!)P;. 
Tax burden and education spe:n<l:mg 
Table 4.3 continued 
Country 
Libya 
Zimbabwe 
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Missing Variable(s) 
Tax burden and education spending as percentage of GDP 
Tax burden, education and health spending as percentage of GDP 
.t~~!l&~P~~~fO(}P;.petyentage 
. . . ;.~Di.~\fat~·~ . . 
Tax burden, education and health spending as percenta e of GDP 
The remaining 137 countries were included in research making the present study the 
broadest existing inquiry into welfare state efficiency. A list of included countries (along with 
the welfare state inputJoutput variables) in Table 4.4 reveals performance differences in the 
relevant indicator variables. 
Table 4.4. Countries and variables included in the study 
Percen- Literate Survival Percen- Public Public 
Total Net tage of Adults rate tage of spen- spen- Tax 
Coun- Enroll- popula- Life through population ding on ding on burden 
tion as Expec- 5 years with health educatio 
ment Ratio percent- as try 
under 5 tancy at per access to as nas percen-Name in Primary 
without tage of birth 1000 improved percent- percent- tage of Education 
stunted populati live water tage of tage of GDP 
growth on births GDP GDP source 
Alba- 87.77 78 76 99 983 97 6.80 1.31 24.3 
rna 
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Table 4.4 continued 
Algeria 95.75 89 72 70 962 83 5.35 4.30 8.0 
Angola 58.00 55 42 67 740 50 3.34 2.60 6.1 
Argentina 99.14 96 75 97 984 97 8.44 4.90 26.1 
Armenia 92.88 87 72 99 976 96 3.77 3.00 16.8 
Australia 97.07 100 81 99 994 100 8.51 4.50 30.8 
Austria 97.37 98 80 98 995 100 10.48 5.40 42.9 
Azerbaijan 83.99 87 67 99 912 80 4.28 2.80 17.7 
Bangladesh 88.38 57 63 48 931 80 3.32 2.40 8.8 
Belarus 94.84 97 69 100 987 100 5.59 4.50 30.4 
Belgium 98.61 97 79 99 996 100 11.12 6.01 46.5 
Benin 92.82 62 56 35 852 75 4.11 3.50 17.2 
Bolivia 92.08 73 65 87 939 86 4.36 6.30 28.5 
Botswana 87.14 77 49 81 876 95 7.58 8.90 30.2 
Brazil 95.12 89 72 89 980 97 8.44 5.08 34.4 
Bulgaria 97.39 91 73 98 986 100 7.07 4.10 33.3 
Burkina Faso 61.17 65 52 24 796 76 5.94 4.60 12.1 
Burundi 99.42 47 49 59 819 72 13.00 8.30 18.0 
Cambodia 88.59 63 59 74 918 61 5.67 2.10 10.5 
Cameroon 88.30 70 50 68 851 74 5.30 3.70 18.5 
Canada 99.48 99 80 99 994 100 9.84 4.90 32.2 
Central 66.28 62 44 49 825 67 4.33 1.30 7.9 
African 
Republic 
Chad 61.18 59 50 26 791 50 6.41 3.20 5.3 
Chile 95.11 99 78 96 991 96 7.49 4.00 18.6 
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Table 4.4 continued 
China 97.02 89 73 91 976 89 4.32 2.09 18.0 
Colombia 93.54 88 73 93 979 92 5.88 4.80 19.3 
Congo, Rep. 63.85 74 54 85 874 71 2.74 1.90 5.3 
Costa Rica 92.00 94 79 95 988 97 9.42 6.30 15.6 
Cote d'Ivoire 57.25 66 48 49 873 80 5.39 4.60 15.2 
Croatia 91.44 99 76 98 994 99 7.83 4.60 23.3 
Cuba 99.51 95 78 100 993 94 12.00 13.60 41.2 
Czech 89.59 98 76 99 996 100 7.11 4.20 36.2 
Republic 
Denmark 95.38 98 78 99 995 100 9.92 7.80 49.0 
Dominican 82.45 93 72 87 971 86 5.71 2.30 15.0 
Republic 
98.35 83 78 89 992 100 2.52 1.20 1.8 
Ecuador 98.86 77 75 91 976 94 5.32 1.31 16.0 
Egypt 95.40 82 71 71 965 99 4.81 3.80 15.4 
El Salvador 95.59 81 72 81 975 87 6.02 3.60 13.0 
Estonia 96.53 99 71 100 993 98 6.11 4.90 32.3 
Ethiopia 82.98 53 52 36 877 38 4.31 5.50 9.9 
Finland 96.19 98 79 100 996 100 8.81 5.90 43.2 
France 99.12 98 80 99 996 100 11.15 5.60 44.6 
Gabon 94.00 79 56 84 909 87 2.63 1.61 9.9 
Gambia 71.58 78 59 40 887 92 5.47 2.00 19.2 
Georgia 99.01 88 71 100 968 98 8.68 3.20 24.9 
Germany 99.69 99 79 99 996 100 10.55 4.50 40.6 
Ghana 76.97 78 59 58 880 82 7.77 5.40 20.6 
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Table 4.4 continued 
Greece 99.62 94 79 96 996 100 10.10 4.00 35.1 
Guatemala 96.45 51 70 69 959 94 6.46 3.20 11.3 
Guinea 72.33 65 55 30 839 71 5.52 2.40 14.7 
Honduras 97.19 75 70 80 973 86 6.29 1.69 16.3 
Hungary 95.43 97 73 99 993 100 7.22 5.20 40.5 
Iceland 97.65 98 82 99 997 100 9.24 7.40 40.1 
India 91.41 52 64 61 924 88 4.17 3.10 18.6 
Indonesia 98.74 60 70 90 966 80 2.26 2.80 13.3 
Iran 99.58 85 71 82 966 92 5.53 4.70 6.1 
Ireland 97.14 98 79 99 995 100 8.74 4.90 30.8 
Israel 97.12 92 80 97 995 100 7.57 5.90 33.5 
Italy 99.25 96 80 98 996 100 8.71 4.30 43.1 
Jamaica 80.51 97 72 80 969 94 4.75 5.80 26.0 
Japan 99.99 94 82 99 996 100 8.29 3.50 28.3 
Jordan 93.70 91 72 91 975 96 9.40 5.10 18.3 
Kazakhstan 99.06 87 66 100 971 95 3.87 2.80 27.7 
Kenya 82.33 70 53 74 879 59 4.23 7.00 20.9 
Korea 99.02 92 78 98 995 98 6.51 4.20 26.6 
Kuwait 93.42 76 77 93 989 99 1.95 3.80 1.5 
Kyrgyz 91.04 86 66 99 959 90 5.70 5.90 23.3 
Republic 
Lao PDR 82.42 58 64 69 925 57 3.99 2.30 12.5 
Latvia 97.00 99 72 100 991 99 6.58 5.00 29.1 
Lebanon 89.28 89 72 87 970 100 8.49 1.80 16.6 
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Table 4.4 continued 
Lesotho 73.19 62 42 82 868 85 7.63 12.40 63.1 
Liberia 40.00 61 45 52 765 68 11.93 2.70 28.6 
Lithuania 96.14 99 73 100 992 97 6.59 4.70 30.6 
Luxembourg 97.45 98 79 100 996 100 6.82 5.40 36.5 
Macedonia 91.54 91 74 96 983 100 6.81 2.59 28.3 
Madagascar 99.28 52 59 59 885 41 4.41 3.00 12.9 
Malawi 91.18 54 47 64 880 80 6.53 4.20 16.5 
Malaysia 94.06 93 74 89 988 100 4.30 4.10 15.3 
Mali 74.66 62 54 24 783 56 5.63 4.40 15.0 
Mauritania 76.90 65 64 51 875 49 2.59 4.40 13.4 
Mauritius 93.14 90 73 84 986 99 5.51 3.20 19.0 
Mexico 99.52 87 76 92 965 94 5.88 4.80 8.2 
Moldova 90.46 92 69 99 981 90 10.65 9.60 33.4 
Mongolia 99.23 79 66 98 957 76 3.75 5.60 30.8 
Morocco 89.92 82 71 52 963 81 5.32 5.60 26.9 
Mozambique 89.27 59 42 39 862 47 4.66 5.00 14.2 
Namibia 90.71 76 52 85 939 92 6.86 6.40 24.8 
Netherlands 98.94 99 79 99 995 100 9.86 5.30 39.8 
New Zealand 99.47 97 80 99 994 100 9.73 6.10 34.5 
Nicaragua 93.44 80 72 77 964 85 9.36 3.10 18.0 
Niger 49.51 50 56 29 747 48 5.86 4.50 11.4 
Nigeria 62.78 62 47 69 809 58 5.18 1.53 5.9 
Norway 98.68 98 80 100 996 100 8.53 6.80 42.1 
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Table 4.4 continued 
Oman 81.22 90 75 81 988 88 2.09 3.90 3.0 
Pakistan 66.13 63 65 50 903 90 2.63 2.70 10.2 
Panama 98.86 82 75 92 977 93 7.23 3.80 10.6 
Paraguay 88.06 86 71 94 978 86 5.97 4.00 11.8 
Peru 97.25 76 71 88 975 82 4.47 2.70 16.0 
Philippines 92.11 70 71 93 968 91 3.68 2.80 14.1 
Poland 95.24 98 75 100 993 100 7.01 4.90 34.9 
Portugal 98.72 96 78 94 995 99 10.57 4.40 37.7 
Qatar 98.37 92 75 89 979 100 2.05 3.30 4.9 
Romania 96.52 90 72 97 982 58 5.44 4.30 28.5 
Russian 92.24 87 65 99 984 96 4.82 3.90 34.1 
Federation 
Rwanda 95.86 55 46 65 840 65 9.41 4.10 13.5 
Saudi Arabia 84.58 80 72 83 975 95 3.59 5.60 6.6 
Senegal 75.19 84 63 39 884 69 5.70 5.80 18.3 
Serbia 98.00 94 74 96 992 99 10.04 4.70 36.3 
Sierra Leone 69.00 60 42 35 730 49 13.33 4.30 10.8 
Singapore 76.90 98 80 89 997 100 3.34 3.00 14.2 
Slovak 92.00 99 74 100 992 100 8.00 3.60 29.3 
Republic 
Slovenia 97.48 97 78 100 996 99 8.29 5.20 37.6 
South Africa 91.37 75 50 82 931 91 8.24 5.40 25.7 
Spain 99.84 96 81 97 996 100 8.97 4.30 33.9 
Sri Lanka 99.48 86 72 91 987 90 4.07 0.98 13.3 
Swaziland 82.91 70 40 80 836 69 5.82 7.80 36.0 
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Table 4.4 continued 
Sweden 94.63 98 81 99 997 100 9.39 6.60 47.9 
Switzerland 99.13 98 81 99 995 100 10.73 5.20 29.4 
Syrian Arab 95.00 78 74 81 986 89 3.06 4.90 10.2 
Republic 
Tajikistan 97.52 73 66 100 932 70 4.95 3.50 18.7 
Tanzania 99.60 62 52 69 882 54 4.53 6.80 14.8 
Thailand 90.77 88 70 93 992 98 4.05 4.10 16.0 
Timor-Leste 77.28 51 60 59 945 69 13.77 16.80 24.6 
Togo 87.30 76 58 53 892 60 5.85 4.60 16.3 
Trinidad and 95.32 96 69 98 962 94 4.66 3.57 19.4 
Tobago 
Tunisia 99.50 88 74 74 977 94 6.16 7.10 22.4 
Turkey 94.69 88 72 87 974 99 6.07 2.90 23.5 
Uganda 97.24 68 50 67 866 67 8.40 3.20 11.9 
Ukraine 89.35 97 68 99 976 98 6.85 5.30 37.7 
United Arab 99.84 98 79 99 994 100 8.66 5.50 38.9 
Emirates 
United 93.14 99 78 99 992 99 15.18 5.50 26.9 
Kingdom 
United States 98.97 89 76 97 988 100 7.78 2.90 17.9 
Uruguay 90.60 85 67 99 957 87 4.89 3.91 19.6 
Uzbekistan 92.09 87 73 93 979 83 5.40 3.70 13.6 
Venezuela 94.00 70 74 90 983 94 7.25 5.30 23.6 
Vietnam 73.03 47 62 54 900 62 5.31 5.20 7.3 
Yemen 97.06 50 41 68 818 60 5.87 1.30 17.5 
Zambia 87.77 78 76 99 983 97 6.80 1.31 24.3 
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4.3 Use of the results 
With the nine key variables sdected for the 137 countries in the sample, it is possible to 
investigate the comparative efficiencies of the individual nations, regions, and welfare state 
regime type groupings. The concept underlying the relationships modeled is that the three input 
variables drive the six output variabh~s . That is, when nations spend more on education and 
health, and when they tax more for other welfare state (and non-welfare state) expenditures, then 
they should be able to achieve better outcomes in education, health, and poverty. 
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Figure 4.8. Google Trends indicator for "austerity'' and "budget cuts" 12 
12 Charts portray the relative frequency of search terms "austerity" and "budget cuts". Source: 
Data from Google Trends (Trends) as of March 8, 2011; graphical presentation original 
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4.3.1 Possible case for retrenchment or austerity 
If nations spend more and achieve less, then the programs are ripe for re-structuring, 
retrenchment, and austerity. Although not popular, "austerity plans" and "budget cuts" are terms 
that are used with increasing frequency at the beginning of the second decade of the twenty first 
century (see search term trends in Figure 4.8). Politicians and policy-makers are re-evaluating 
the relationship between the state and the individual. Many are argue for more efficient public 
spending (The Economist 2011 ), for increased private provision of services formerly provided by 
the state, and for a 'welfare state retrenchment in general', although few argue that all state 
provided services should be eliminated. Related discussions tend to polarize the discussants, and 
progress in this realm is often difficult. 
4.4 Model specifications 
What is lacking in today's discussion is the technical understanding of comparative welfare 
state efficiencies. If we are able to show existing levels of output can be provided by using less 
input, then policy-makers from both sides of the political spectrum can find new common ground 
to propose solutions in this politically sensitive area. Austerity plans can become less painful if 
expenditures can be saved through increased efficiency and the output cuts can be reduced or 
avoided. In a way, identifying efficiency slacks can subsequently allow the inefficient states to 
'have their cake and eat it too' if proposals to cut spending and maintain output become possible. 
In order to carry out these comparisons, Data Envelopment Analysis was applied to the 
data in the four model specifications highlighted in Figure 4.9. 
137 Countries 
7 R"1j;ons 
3 We-lfare State Types 
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Con istenq of results: 
Figure 4.9. Diagram of model specifications 
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Specification A carried out a straight forward input-focused Data Envelopment Analysis 
with the three inputs and six outputs and an enforced assumption of constant returns to scale. For 
reasons discussed in section 2.5 .1 and in the results of this specification, constant returns to scale 
was found to be unlikely to yield a good representation of the real relationship between inputs 
and outputs. The principle of diminishing marginal returns implies that the 'low hanging fruit' 
would be collected by the early, not the subsequent welfare state incentives. 
With this in mind, the model was re-specified to allow for decreasing returns to scale in 
model specification B. This specification results in a high number of independently efficient 
welfare states, reducing the explanatory power of the model. The model was therefore re-
specified for two additional iterations - specification C used a reduced number of output 
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variables, and specification D used a normalized and aggregated composite output variable in the 
place of six output variables used before. The consistency of results was then tested to check the 
sensitivity of results to model specifications. 
CHAPTERS 
MODELLING EFFICIENCY: RESULTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
5.1 Specification A: results in three-input/six output, CRS model 
During the first scenario, three inputs were used along with all six outputs in an input-
oriented constant returns to scale (CRS) single step Data Envelopment Model using the DEAP 
software13 developed by Tim Coelli. (T. J. Coelli 1996) The resultant efficiency scores for all 
countries in the sample are included in Appendix 1 and presented graphically in Figure 5 .1. 
00.1'5.2000 .Q 29g{)QQ 
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Figure 5.1. DEA results- model specification A (three input, six output, CRS) 
13 After evaluating Stata, DEA Frontier (Excel Add-in), DEA Solver and DEAP, a decision was 
made to proceed with DEAP because of the flexibility the package offered for utilizing multiple 
variations ofDEA as well as for the ease speed of processing this DEA solver application 
provided compared with the others. 
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Country efficiencies vary from 1.0 in United Arab Emirates and Kuwait to 0.190 and 0.152 
in Burundi and Timor-Leste respectively. In Specification A, 15 countries report independently 
perfect efficiency scores and the mean efficiency score for the entire sample is 0.457. What is the 
meaning of these 15 perfect efficiency scores? It is important to remember that within Data 
Envelopment Analysis, a non-parametric approach to a best-practice efficiency frontier, the 
DMUs with the lowest input (in any input category) or the highest output (in any output 
dimension) will be selected as maximally efficient. This is to say that Kuwait, with the lowest 
'tax burden' input is automatically selected as 100% efficient and United Arab Emirates, with 
the highest possible education output in 'poverty' is also selected as I 00% efficient. 
An examination of the developed nations' welfare states included in this sample is 
revealing. Selected OECD countries are included in Table 5.1 below to illustrate inter-country 
differences in welfare state efficiency for the developed nations. 
Table 5 .I. Welfare State Efficiency for OECD Countries -model specification A 
Country SpecA Eff. Score Rankin~ under SpecA 
Japan 0.3760 1 
Australia 0.3510 2 
Ireland 0.3310 3 
Italy 0.3310 4 
United Kingdom 0.3270 5 
Finland 0.3180 6 
Norway 0.3160 7 
Germany 0.3070 8 
Canada 0.3030 9 
Netherlands 0.2990 10 
Sweden 0.2960 11 
New Zealand 0.2890 12 
Austria 0.2810 13 
Switzerland 0.2750 14 
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Table 5.1 continued 
Country SpecA Eff. Score Ranking under SpecA 
Denmark 0.2740 15 
France 0.2640 16 
Belgium 0.2580 17 
United States 0.2420 18 
The results are quite surprising. Japan and Australia are shown as being the most efficient 
welfare states among the listed 18 OECD nations, an indication that these nations have been able 
to achieve more in education, poverty prevention, and health, per fraction of GDP dedicated to 
these areas than the United States and the Scandinavian Countries. 
While the results of the Constant Returns to Scale ( CRS) efficiency analysis are intriguing, 
the question inevitably arises as to why the Scandinavian nations and the higher spending nations 
in general tend to group at the bottom of this group of selected countries. When individual 
nations are compared, many of the efficiency leaders are the relatively low spending nations 
while Belgium, Denmark, France, United States, the high spenders, do not do particularly well in 
this efficiency measure. While we assume that providing more input to the welfare state will 
produce more output, is it reasonable to also assume that doubling the input would necessarily 
double the output? In a model where Constant Returns of Scale are assumed for the theoretical 
efficient frontier, it is presumed that a doubling of resources devoted to an outcome should lead 
to a doubling of the outcome indicator. The first percentage point of GDP that is devoted to 
education should have the same impact as the twentieth percentage point of GDP in government 
spending on education. This assumption is probably not realistic 
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5.2 Variable Returns to Scale- a reasonable assumption in welfare state modeling 
One of basic properties in economic life is diminishing returns, "the property whereby the 
benefit from an extra unit of input declines as the quantity of the input increases." (Mankiw 
2008) Is it possible that this property is absent in the case of the welfare state as assumed in 
model specification A? A simple examination of the correlation ofGNI per capita and Life 
expectancy (see Figure 5.2) shows that at the very least, there seem to be diminishing returns to 
wealth when it comes to "earning" a higher life expectancy. 
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Figure 5.2. Life Expectancy and GNI per capita, 137 nations 
Similarly, a casual observation of life expectancy and the central government spending (see 
Figure 5.3) also reveals a non-constant return to scale relationship between spending and life 
expectancy, albeit a much weaker relationship (life expectancy is affected, after all, by many 
other factors beyond government spending on health, so it is expected that an excessively close 
relationship between spending and life expectancy would not be uncovered.) 
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Figure 5.3. Health spending and life expectancy; 137 countries 
Presentations of the simple correlation between the selected variables above suggest that 
non-constant (diminishing) returns of scale exist in regard to welfare state effort, and the 
utilization of VRS models by other researchers adds to the validity of this conclusion. (Herrera 
and Pang 2005), (Cincera, Czarnitzki and Thorwarth 2009) 
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Figure 5.4. Returns to Scale for welfare state inputs/outputs 
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As illustrated in Figure 5.4, higher spending countries tend to be viewed as inefficient if we 
assume CRS where VRS is present. In panel A, countries X and Y are viewed as inefficient since 
they spend more than other countries on their welfare state effort, but do not reach the 
proportionally greater expected welfare state outcomes implied by CRS. In panel B, similar 
countries X and Y are now viewed as efficient since CRS is no longer assumed. The greater 
welfare state effort is rewarded with greater welfare state outcome, albeit by a diminishing 
margin. It is worth noting that a country which is efficient under variable returns to scale would 
also be efficient under constant returns to scale, but the converse does not necessarily hold. 
5.2.1 Decomposition of inefficiencies under VRS 
In addition to being more realistic, the assumption of variable returns to scale in welfare 
state inputs/outputs has the advantage of allowing researchers to decompose the efficiency slacks 
into their constituent programmatic inefficiencies (pure technical efficiencies) and scale 
inefficiencies. Banker proposed this approach where the Scale Efficiency (SE) measure for each 
DMU (presently- country) would indicate the ratio of CRS total efficiency to VRS total 
efficiency. (Banker, Charnes and Cooper 1984) Where SE is less than one, the combination of 
inputs and outputs is not scale efficient. Scale inefficiency in the welfare state context yields 
opportunities to raise the output by better leveraging the system resources in education, health, 
poverty prevention and the other welfare state dimensions. 
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5.3 Specification B: results in three-inputs/six-outputs, VRS model 
With variable returns to scale the input and output data remain the same as in the previous 
model specification, but the efficiency scores are calculated with the new assumption. The 
results of the input-focused Data Envelopment Analysis are presented in Figure 5.5 and are listed 
in detail in Appendix 1, column "SpecB". 
5.3.1 Individual nation welfare state efficiencies -specification B 
Introduction of Variable Returns to Scale assumption into the welfare state efficiency 
model should make more welfare states individually perfectly efficient, and this is indeed the 
result. In a1145 countries now reflect individual perfect efficiency (32.8% of the sample), as do 
10 of the 18 OECD countries included for comparison in Table 5.2 below. 
Figure 5.5. DEA results- model specification B (three input, six output, VRS) 
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This is a normal result since the previously enforced assumption of constant returns to scale 
is relaxed and the new VRS efficient frontier is not as rigid as the former CRS frontier. Japan 
and Australia still lead the efficiency rankings from the selected group (rankings first by VRS 
efficiency score, then by scale efficiency14), which is explained by the combination of the 
relatively proportionally high performance in welfare state output and the relatively low level of 
tax burden in the respective nations. The lagging nations have high commitments to the welfare 
state inputs without matching high performance in outputs, as compared to the other nations in 
the sample which consume similar inputs but produce greater outputs. 
Table 5.2. OECD nation welfare state efficiencies- model specification B 
SpecB 
Country Efficiency Score Ranking under SpecB 
Japan 1.000 1 
Australia 1.000 1 
United Kingdom 1.000 1 
Finland 1.000 1 
Norway 1.000 1 
Germany 1.000 1 
Canada 1.000 1 
Sweden 1.000 1 
Switzerland 1.000 1 
United States 1.000 1 
Ireland 0.996 11 
Netherlands 0.977 12 
Italy 0.937 13 
New Zealand 0.913 14 
14 An inefficient country in the CRS model which becomes efficient in the VRS model would have its entire 
efficiency slack attributed to scale (in)efficiency (SE), so theSE score for Estonia in the VRS model is equivalent to 
the Total Efficiency score for Estonia in the CRS model. Countries which are inefficient in both models have 
efficiencies decomposed, so that the total VRS inefficiency comes partially from scale inefficiency and partially 
from technical (programmatic) inefficiency. Scale efficiency estimates for the sample countries are shown in 
Appendix 4) 
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Table 5.2 continued 
SpecB 
Country Efficiency Score Ranking under SpecB 
France 0.871 15 
Austria 0.797 16 
Belgium 0.726 17 
Denmark 0.693 18 
The fact that so many countries emerge as independently efficient is quite problematic, 
since it prevents efficiency comparisons between the respective welfare states which could yield 
potential ideas for programmatic improvement. Indeed, little can be learned about welfare state 
efficiency differences from countries deemed independently efficient. Other researchers have hit 
similar roadblocks when exploring efficiency differences in welfare state designs or in public 
spending and several standard solutions have been proposed. 
Some suggest simply cutting output indicators to reduce the number of independently 
efficient DMUs (Gupta and Verhoeven 2001) while others address the problem by constructing 
input or output indexes instead of using separate input/output variables (Coelli, Lefebvre and 
Pestieau 2008) Reducing the number of input and output variables does indeed result in fewer 
independently efficient countries simply by the virtue of the properties ofDEA methodology. 
With fewer variables, there are fewer potential dimensions along which a country can be deemed 
to be efficient (note that a country which is fully efficient in any one dimension is deemed 
independently fully efficient in the traditional DEA model). For example, eliminating the literacy 
rate as a welfare state output measure in education would reduce the number of independently 
efficient countries in the present model from 32.8% of all countries to 19.7% of countries (See 
data in Appendix 2). 
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5.3.2 Regional variations in welfare state efficiencies - specification B 
Regional differences in welfare state efficiency are evident in this model. In order to 
evaluate regional efficiency differences the 137 nations in the sample were divided in seven 
subgroups: Africa, Asia, former Commonwealth ofindependent States, Latin America, non-
OECD Europe, OECD, and South-East Asia. The regions are selected based on the United 
Nations Statistics Division regional guidelines (United Nations 2011) and are intended to provide 
a general regional comparison between welfare state efficiencies. A finer break-down in regional 
assignments could be utilized, for example, separating East Asia (China, Mongolia) from the 
Western Asia (Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Iran) or separating the Caribbean from the Latin 
America, but, this is not pursued in this document but ]eft for subsequent investigation. 
Table 5.3. Regional divisions of the sample countries 
Africa {n=40} 
Algeria Gabon Mozambique 
Angola Gambia Namibia 
Benin Ghana Niger 
Botswana Guinea Nigeria 
Burkina Faso Kenya Rwanda 
Burundi Lesotho Senegal 
Cameroon Liberia Sierra Leone 
Central African Republic Madagascar South Africa 
Chad Malawi Swaziland 
Congo, Rep. Mali Tanzania 
Cote d'lvoire Mauritania Togo 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Mauritius Tunisia 
Ethiopia Morocco Uganda 
Zambia 
Asia (n=19) 
Bangladesh Korea, Rep. Saudi Arabia 
China Kuwait Sri Lanka 
Dubai (UAE) Lebanon ublic 
Table 5.3 continued 
Asia (n=19) continued 
India 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Israel 
Jordan 
Mongolia 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Qatar 
Turkey 
Yemen, Rep. 
Former Commonwealth of Independent States (n=lO) 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Moldova 
Russian Federation 
Non-OECD Europe (n=20) 
Albania 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Greece 
Hungary 
Latin America (n=21) 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
OECD nations (n=18) 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
Iceland 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia, FYR 
Poland 
Portugal 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Tajikistan 
Uzbekistan 
Romania 
Serbia 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Ukraine 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
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Table 5.3 continued 
South-East Asia (n=9) 
Cambodia 
Indonesia 
Lao PDR 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Sin a ore 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Vietnam 
The regional comparison within this model specification (see Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7) 
reveals that the OECD countries are the most efficient, with an average efficiency of93 .94%, 
followed by the European non-OECD countries (average efficiency 93 .19% ). 
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Figure 5.6. Regional efficiency scores and average sample efficiency in model specification B 
The direct meaning of the uncovered efficiency in this model is that per dollar of taxes 
collected, percent of GDP spent on education, and percent of GDP spent on health, the OECD 
nations are able to achieve greater output in health measures, education measures, and poverty 
prevention measures than are other regional groupings of nations. Africa reveals the lowest 
average efficiency ( 52.14%) and South-East Asia and Latin America do only slightly better 
(67.17% and 73.03% respectively). All three of the poorly performing regions fall below the 
unweighted average for all nations in the sample- 74.89% welfare state efficiency. 
Figure 5.7. DEA results- regional efficiencies in model specification B 
5.3.3 Welfare state efficiencies by type of welfare state regime- specification B 
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Ever since the publication ofGosta Esping-Andersen's seminal work on welfare state 
regime types, there has been a significant amount of discussion regarding the types of welfare 
state arrangements in the OECD countries. (Esping-Andersen 1990) One goal for the present 
study was to apply DEA methodology to welfare state input and output variable data in order to 
compare the efficiencies of the various welfare state types. Although multiple typologies of 
welfare states exist, this study splits the welfare state arrangements in the three classic varieties 
of Liberal, Conservative, and Social-Democratic Welfare states. See Table 5.4 for country-
identification along the welfare state regime types. 
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Conservative welfare state regimes are 'corporatist' in nature. The state provides income 
maintenance benefits based on occupational status, an arrangement that leads to moderate 
decommodification from the labor market. Private insurance and private fringe benefits are quite 
limited in corporatist welfare states, so the state provides a significant amount of benefits. 
However, the redistributive element is largely missing, since the benefits are closely associated 
with work status. Liberal welfare state regimes offer means-tested assistance and very basic 
universal transfers or social insurance plans. Entitlement rules are relatively strict, and states 
utilize market solutions for some traditional welfare state roles, and subsequentally levels of 
decommodification from labor market are markedly low. Social-Democratic welfare state 
regimes purposefully crowd out the market from welfare state roles, and offer largely universal, 
non-means tested benefits and high degrees of decommodification from the labor market. (Arts 
and Gelissen 2002) 
Table 5.4. Welfare state regime types 
Conservative Liberal Social-Democratic 
Japan Australia Norway 
Finland Canada Sweden 
Germany Ireland Netherlands 
Switzerland New Zealand Austria 
Italy United Kingdom Belgium 
France United States Denmark 
Are there efficiency differences between the three types of welfare state regimes? Three-
input/six-output specification indicates that there are indeed efficiency variations between the 
regime types. Liberal and conservative welfare state types reach the highest efficiency, while 
social-democratic types are unable to convert inputs into outputs with matching efficiency. 
Cc,.,:;e rvet ive 
5oc ia !-O~mcc~tic 
I 
- -- ----- ~--l.------.----
Figure 5.8. DEA results- welfare state type efficiencies in model specification B 
While each type has representative countries with independently perfect efficiency, on 
average the social-democratic welfare states exhibit lower efficiency and greater variability of 
efficiency. 
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Figure 5.9. Welfare state type efficiency map for OECD nations - specification B 
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With high tax burdens in social-democratic regimes, there is little room for slack in output 
variables before a state is deemed inefficient using the DEA methodology. Thus, even though 
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Denmark and Belgium, for example, outperform the average nations in all welfare state output 
variables, they still do worse than Norway. As a result, while Norway is deemed to be efficient, 
Denmark and Belgium show significant efficiency slacks (0.3070 and 0.2740, respectively) in 
relation to Norway. Other research has also found the higher spending states to be less efficient 
(Gupta and Verhoeven 2001). 
5.4 Specification C: results in three-inputs/three-outputs, VRS model 
In order to test the resiliency of the results, the model is now narrowed to three outputs that 
proxy the educational, health, and poverty-prevention dimensions of welfare state performance. 
The three variables used are total net enrollment, stunting in five-and-under children, and life 
expectancy at birth. While this model is less diverse than the three-input, six-output model, it 
nevertheless has the ability to capture more welfare state efficiency differences. By reducing the 
number of outputs fewer countries become independently perfectly efficient (see Figure 5.1 0) 
and more efficiency comparisons become possible. 
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Figure 5.10. DEA results- model specification C (three-input/three-output, VRS) 
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5.4.1 Regional variations in welfare state efficiencies - specification C 
The first thing to note in the narrowed model is the resiliency of regional variability of the 
efficiency results . The OECD nations and European nations still lead the regional efficiency with 
Africa, CIS, South-East Asia, and Latin America trailing in efficiency. (It is true that the former 
CIS nations now rank lower than before in efficiency, but the other regions have kept the 
efficiency ranking order the same as in the previous model.) 
Average efficiency: ~.6920 
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Figure 5.11 . Regional efficiency scores and average sample efficiency in model specification C 
Perhaps there are region-specific reasons why welfare state efficiency, as measured by the 
three-output/three-input model is significantly higher in OECD nations than it is in Africa and 
Latin America. One reason for the apparent inefficiencies in the African and Latin American 
nation welfare state is the fact that health and education spending reaches only residents in the 
higher income brackets. With health and education available to the higher income earners it is 
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possible that the spending succeeds in improving health and educational goals for that sub-
population while not impacting the outcomes for the larger, poorer population. Gupta and 
Verhoeven provide some evidence," . . . budgetary allocations for curative care in Bolivia are 
excessive and there is a high concentration of health facilities in higher-income regions ... . The 
bottom 20% of the population [of Ghana] received 16% of the benefits of education spending in 
1992. Only 11% of health spending went to the poorest 20%, and urban Ghana received 49% of 
the health budget, despite the fact that only 33% of the population lived in urban areas. Primary 
education in Togo received 41% of the 1995 education budget, even though primary school 
enrollment accounted for 83% of the school population." (Gupta and Verhoeven 2001) 
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Figure 5.12. DEA results- regional efficiencies in model specification C 
5.4.2 Welfare state efficiencies by type of welfare state regime - specification C 
Much as in Specification B, there are clear efficiency differences between the welfare 
regime types, with Conservative and Liberal types outperforming Social-Democratic types. 
71 
L 
Figure 5.13. Welfare state type efficiency map for OECD nations- specification B 
Even though Norway and Netherlands (Social-Democratic welfare states) do very well 
with efficiencies of0.9530 and 0.9350 respectively, the other Social-democratic welfare states -
Sweden, Austria, Belgium, and Denmark do not exhibit an ability to convert health spending, 
education spending, and tax revenue (spent on poverty relief and pensions, among other outlays) 
into welfare state outcomes with the same efficiency than their Conservative and Liberal welfare 
state counterparts. Some, but not all, of this inefficiency for Social-Democratic welfare states is 
attributable to the higher tax burdens. 
Figure 5.14. DEA results- welfare state type efficiencies in model specification B 
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5.5 Specification D: DEA results using an HDI-type performance index 
When an excessive number of independently efficient DMUs prevents efficiency 
comparisons, then a common solution is to combine the outputs into an index variable. Instead of 
evaluating the welfare state performance in multiple output dimensions, this approach combines 
the normalized values of the given number of output variables into one indicator measure, 
similar to the way that the UN Human Development Index (HOI) assigns an index value for a 
nation's 'human development' based on multiple selected indicators. By reducing the number of 
output dimensions fewer nations would be reported as independently perfectly efficient, allowing 
for a more in-depth comparison of the welfare state efficiencies in the sample. 
Under this approach, the variables are first normalized and then the normalized variables 
are averaged to arrive at a ranking for the nations ' output indicators. (United Nations 
Development Program 1990) To normalize a variable, I follow the HOI methodology in 
calculating a ratio where the numerator is the difference between the country's output variable 
and the minimum variable in the range, while the denominator is the range (for the variable) 
between the largest and smallest observed variables. 
x,,- min {.rllk r / . = ' k ' --
. 
111 
max {x11k } - min {xnk } k k 
The resultant value is a value that is by definition between zero and one (inclusive), with 
the highest (lowest) normalized values reserved for the performance leaders (laggards) in a 
particular variable. After the values have been normalized, an arithmetic average is found for the 
normalized variables for a particular nation, with the outcome, some Welfare State Output Index 
(WSOI) falling between zero and one. 
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With a WSOI calculated for each nation, it is this index (not the six different outputs) that 
is used as the proxy for welfare state output. See Appendix 3 for a listing of nations in the sample 
along with their normalized variables and WSOI values used in this model specification. 
Data Envelopment Analysis is used to calculate the relative efficiencies of the 137 nations 
in the sample in transforming the three inputs (education spending, health spending, tax burden) 
into the index output. A model respecified along these lines yields results that can be analyzed 
separately or in tandem with previous specifications to test for durability. 
5.5.1 Individual nation welfare state efficiencies - specification D 
As expected, the number of independently perfectly efficient nations drops drastically in 
this specification. Only 7 out of 13 7 nations ( 5 .I%) report perfect efficiency, since WSOI 
reduces the number of dimensions in which nations can 'earn' perfect independent efficiency. 
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Figure 5.15. DEA results- model specification D (HDI-type performance index) 
74 
Among the OECD nations, this specification reveals Japan, Australia, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and Norway to have the most efficient welfare states with efficiencies of 1.000, 
0.9700, 0.9630, 0.0.941 0, and 0.9400 respectively. 
5.5.2 Regional variations in welfare state efficiencies - specification D 
Regional efficiency differences are quite durable through the multiple specifications in this 
research, with OECD, European nations, and Asian nations ranking higher than average and 
Africa, former Commonwealth oflndependent States, Latin America, and South-East Asia 
ranking lower than the average. Europe and Asia do switch places in efficiency rankings, but the 
regional averages are nearly identical at 0.6877 and 0.6818. Asia does very well in this 
specification largely because of the way countries are grouped, with the Arabian peninsula 
countries included in Asia. Quatar, Kuwait, UAE all have relatively low tax burdens and 
relatively good provision of welfare state related services, resulting in very high efficiency 
indicators. 
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Figure 5.16. Regional efficiency scores and average sample efficiency in model specification C 
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5.5.3 Welfare state efficiencies by type of welfare state regime- specification D 
The types of welfare states exhibit similar efficiencies as in the previous model 
specifications, providing support for the general resiliency of type specific efficiencies. In 
Specification D, the Liberal welfare state regimes are the most efficient. The liberal regimes, 
with efficiencies ranging from 0.6790 in the United States to 0.9700 in Australia, are typified by 
lower tax burdens than Social-Democratic and Conservative Regimes, but they still manage to 
generate, on average, better welfare state outcomes than the other welfare state types. 
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Figure 5.1 7. DEA results - welfare state type efficiencies in model specification B 
Higher taxing and higher spending Social-Democratic states do not reach the outcomes that 
can be deemed efficient in comparison the observed universe of welfare state input/output 
combinations. Such lack of efficiency is not entirely surprising given the metrics involved; since 
the Social-Democratic welfare states are characterized by a largely universal provision of 
benefits and by workers' decommodification from labor market then benefits and services are 
available to recipients regardless of their need or contribution. Such an arrangement may score 
well on fairness or equity metrics, but its efficiency measures are relatively low. Conservative 
(corporatist) welfare states with their reliance on social insurance schemes just slightly trail the 
liberal arrangements which rely heavier on means-testing and selective provision of services. 
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Figure 5.18. Welfare state type efficiency map for OECD nations- specification D 
5.6 Consistency of results across model specifications 
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Welfare state efficiency is somewhat sensitive to the model specification, yet the reassuring 
finding is that the regional efficiencies and typological efficiencies hold relatively well across 
specifications. 
Out of the three welfare state types, Liberal and Conservative Welfare state types exhibit 
the highest efficiency in converting scarce inputs into desirable outputs, while Social-Democratic 
welfare state consistently lags in efficiency in all model specifications. With universalistic 
insurance coverage and homogenous benefit levels the Social-Democratic welfare state types 
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tend to rely less on means testing (almost by definition) and less on private market provision of 
services. As a result, government provided services are a norm that is available by virtue of 
citizenship and not necessarily contribution. 
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Figure 5.19. Consistency of results across model specifications 
A partial explanation for the lower efficiency of the welfare state in Social-Democratic 
welfare states has to do with the theorized lower efficiency of government provision of services 
when compared to efficiency of private provision of services. 
The regional welfare state efficiencies similarly exhibit a good measure of consistency 
across model specifications (see Figure 5.20), with the OECD nations consistently leading 
efficiency regional efficiency scores and African nations lagging in the rankings. The former 
Commonwealth of Independent States nations display the greatest sensitivity to the model 
specification, ranking third of seven regions in Specification B and second to last in efficiency in 
Specification D, but this is largely explained by the inclusion of literacy rates as one of the 
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educational outputs of the welfare state in Specification B (CIS nations consistently score well in 
literacy, which is one of selected education outputs of the welfare state in Specification B). 
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Figure 5 .20. Consistency of results across regions 
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From the regional perspective, African welfare states ' inability to show efficiency presents 
the biggest problem. Even though on average the African nations spend less on education and 
health than do nations in other parts of the world and (in many cases) their tax rates are relatively 
low, they are still unable to generate the types of welfare state outputs that would correspond to 
their relative levels of inputs in an efficient way. 
CHAPTER6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Efficiency of the welfare state is an elusive concept that is nevertheless increasingly 
important in the age of the "encroaching Leviathon" 15 . This study makes the case that efficiency 
of the welfare case can and should be studied, since by uncovering and addressing the 
inefficiencies the state can be better able to meet its responsibilities toward its residents in a time 
of fiscal difficulty. The welfare state efficiency investigated here using Data Envelopment 
Analysis finds efficiency differences between countries, regions, and welfare state types. The 
study finds that the OECD nations are more efficient than other nations in converting welfare 
state inputs into outputs, especially when compared with African, Latin American, and South-
East Asian nations. Non-OECD European and Asian nations rank above average in welfare state 
efficiency while former CIS nations are somewhat too sensitive to model specifications to allow 
a consistent efficiency ranking among other regions. 
Not all OECD nations have equally efficient welfare states. Differences in OECD welfare 
state types have been studied extensively in the three decades since Gosta Esping-Andersen's 
work in welfare state typology, but not with particular attention to efficiency of each type. This 
15 The term "Leviathan" is borrowed from the usage in the March 17, 2011 edition of the 
Economist magazine, where an article "Taming Leviathan" made the case that state could and 
should be made more efficient. "This ... central argument is that Leviathan can be made far more 
efficient. The state has woefully lagged behind the private sector. Catching up is not just a case 
of nuts-and-bolts productivity improvements but of liberal principle: too often an institution that, 
at least in a democracy, was supposed to be the people's servant has become their master." (The 
Economist 2011) 
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study adds to the typology discussion by finding that Liberal and Conservative Welfare states 
outperform the Social-Democratic welfare states in input conversion into outputs. While the task 
of identifying the sources of (in)efficiency within the particular welfare state types is left for 
subsequent study, some direction for that work is proposed. 
What can be done about efficiency differences in welfare states around the world? Some 
efficiency gains can be made by making programmatic adjustments and studying the example of 
the efficiency leaders. For example, while Latin America as a region displays low welfare state 
efficiency, Chile does quite well across a number of model specifications, so researchers should 
look into the particular design features of Chile's welfare state policies and institutions to 
uncover the successful elements. To the extent that such elements can be identified and 
replicated, efficiency gains can lead to real budgetary savings or outcome improvements in 
education, health, poverty prevention or income replacement. 
Similarly, typological efficiency should be better understood. What are the replicable 
features of the Liberal or Conservative welfare states in the OECD countries that should be 
adopted by the efficiency-seeking developing nations? What are the features of the Social-
Democratic welfare states that should be avoided? 
Of course, not all welfare state output is determined by the endogenous welfare state 
inputs; there are many exogenous variables that cannot be controlled (at least in the short run) 
which still effect welfare state outcomes. Weather, diet, exposure to climate events, or cultural 
attitudes to learning are all variables that affect health outcomes, educational outcomes, and 
poverty outcomes, while being outside the direct reach ofpolicymakers' influence (at least in the 
short run). 
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This study has confirmed that efficiency can be studied and that substantial efficiency 
differences exist today, but this study has also revealed that the lack of comparable international 
data prevents a more in-depth analysis at the present time. Data on poverty and income 
replacement are especially difficult to compare among nations, and creation or systematization of 
this kind of data would be of invaluable help to welfare state researchers in the future. Without 
better data, the current findings are somewhat too sensitive to variable inclusion in the model. 
Welfare state efficiency will continue to be a topic that demands attention as national 
budgets shrink and needs grow. Demographic realities will combine with consequences of past 
profligacy to force policy-makers to do more with less. "The Leviathan" that is the modern 
welfare state will be tamed eventually through the inevitability of fiscal and economic forces, 
and to the extent that it will be tamed through efficiency gains instead of indiscriminate cuts, the 
populations will benefit. 
APPENDIX 1 
LISTING OF CALCULATED EFFICIENCY SCORES FOR EACH 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
"SpecA": Specification A. Three-input/Six-output model, constant returns to scale (CRS) 
"SpecB": Specification B. Three-input/Six-output model, variable returns to scale (VRS) 
"SpecC": Specification C. Three-input/three-output model, variable returns to scale (VRS) 
"SpeeD": Specification D. Three-input/one-index-output model, variable returns to scale (VRS) 
SpecA SpecB SpecC SpeeD 
Albania 0.8140 1.0000 0.8600 0.7480 
Algeria 0.4570 0.5680 0.5680 0.4410 
Angola 0.5310 0.7100 0.7100 0.7100 
Argentina 0.3340 0.9440 0.8530 0.5180 
Armenia 0.6910 1.0000 0.6550 0.6280 
Australia 0.3510 1.0000 1.0000 0.9700 
Austria 0.2810 0.7970 0.7580 0.6980 
Azerbaijan 0.6270 1.0000 0.6240 0.5680 
Bangladesh 0.6780 0.7220 0.7220 0.7220 
Belarus 0.4770 1.0000 0.8970 0.6000 
Belgium 0.2580 0.7260 0.6650 0.6530 
Benin 0.5380 0.5700 0.5700 0.5700 
Bolivia 0.4640 0.4840 0.4840 0.4840 
Botswana 0.2770 0.2910 0.2910 0.2910 
Brazil 0.3070 0.3920 0.3790 0.2910 
Bulgaria 0.3830 0.8820 0.5910 0.5250 
Burkina Paso 0.3220 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 
Burundi 0.1900 0.4100 0.4100 0.1880 
Cambodia 0.4970 0.5370 0.5370 0.5370 
Cameroon 0.4080 0.4540 0.4540 0.4540 
Canada 0.3030 1.0000 1.0000 0.8790 
Central African 
Republic 0.7090 0.8510 0.8510 0.8510 
Chad 0.3110 0.3910 0.3910 0.3910 
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Chile 0.3930 1.0000 1.0000 0.8040 
China 0.6230 0.8610 0.8610 0.5810 
Colombia 0.4170 0.5180 0.4320 0.4010 
Congo, Rep. 0.8360 0.8810 0.8810 0.8810 
Costa Rica 0.2850 1.0000 0.9180 0.5280 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.3830 0.4340 0.4340 0.4340 
Croatia 0.3700 1.0000 0.8710 0.6430 
Cuba 0.2070 1.0000 0.5960 0.4650 
Czech Republic 0.4030 1.0000 0.8400 0.7040 
Denmark 0.2740 0.6930 0.6650 0.6150 
Dominican Republic 0.5560 0.9380 0.9380 0.5010 
Ecuador 0.7900 0.9520 0.8320 0.7640 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.4870 0.4920 0.4920 0.4920 
El Salvador 0.4020 0.4080 0.4080 0.4080 
Estonia 0.4450 1.0000 1.0000 0.7580 
Ethiopia 0.4470 0.5040 0.5040 0.5040 
Finland 0.3180 1.0000 0.7650 0.7980 
France 0.2640 0.8710 0.8110 0.7380 
Gabon 0.8910 0.9320 0.9320 0.9320 
Gambia, The 0.5350 0.5610 0.5610 0.5610 
Georgia 0.3920 1.0000 0.5020 0.3580 
Germany 0.3070 1.0000 1.0000 0.7860 
Ghana 0.2840 0.3100 0.3100 0.3100 
Greece 0.3220 0.8710 0.8270 0.7310 
Guatemala 0.3800 0.3880 0.3880 0.3880 
Guinea 0.4140 0.4890 0.4890 0.4890 
Honduras 0.6070 0.6170 0.6170 0.6170 
Hungary 0.3770 0.8710 0.7310 0.6540 
Iceland 0.2920 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
India 0.5350 0.5720 0.5720 0.5720 
Indonesia 0.9730 1.0000 1.0000 0.9650 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.4310 1.0000 1.0000 0.4240 
Ireland 0.3310 0.9960 0.8330 0.8410 
Israel 0.3410 0.8440 0.7520 0.7110 
Italy 0.3310 0.9370 0.8900 0.8450 
Jamaica 0.5010 0.6580 0.6580 0.4610 
Japan 0.3760 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Jordan 0.2870 0.4920 0.4800 0.2640 
Kazakhstan 0.6900 1.0000 0.8490 0.6200 
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Kenya 0.4300 0.4820 0.4820 0.4820 
Korea, Rep. 0.4110 1.0000 0.7230 0.7500 
Kuwait 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.4340 0.7190 0.3970 0.3970 
Lao PDR 0.5770 0.6180 0.6180 0.6180 
Latvia 0.4190 1.0000 1.0000 0.7110 
Lebanon 0.6260 1.0000 0.8250 0.5830 
Lesotho 0.2390 0.2680 0.2680 0.2680 
Liberia 0.2940 0.3800 0.3800 0.3800 
Lithuania 0.4220 1.0000 0.9750 0.7180 
Luxembourg 0.3960 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Macedonia, FYR 0.4750 1.0000 0.7160 0.4630 
Madagascar 0.5540 0.8630 0.8630 0.5490 
Malawi 0.3460 0.3730 0.3730 0.3730 
Malaysia 0.5690 0.8050 0.7220 0.5340 
Mali 0.3330 0.4210 0.4210 0.4210 
Mauritania 0.6930 0.7820 0.7820 0.7820 
Mauritius 0.4790 0.6770 0.6110 0.4470 
Mexico 0.4130 1.0000 1.0000 0.4010 
Moldova 0.2400 0.6170 0.2670 0.2180 
Mongolia 0.5950 1.0000 0.9280 0.5570 
Morocco 0.4140 0.4250 0.4250 0.4250 
Mozambique 0.4380 0.4830 0.4830 0.4830 
Namibia 0.3190 0.3360 0.3360 0.3360 
Netherlands 0.2990 0.9770 0.9350 0.8320 
New Zealand 0.2890 0.9130 0.8840 0.8500 
Nicaragua 0.3490 0.3580 0.3580 0.3580 
Niger 0.3060 0.4060 0.4060 0.4060 
Nigeria 0.6130 0.7510 0.7510 0.7510 
Norway ' 0.3160 1.0000 0.9530 0.9410 
Oman 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9460 
Pakistan 0.7870 0.8630 0.8630 0.8630 
Panama 0.3560 0.7420 0.4980 0.3450 
Paraguay 0.4260 0.7550 0.4260 0.4060 
Peru 0.5430 0.5490 0.5490 0.5490 
Philippines 0.6700 0.7660 0.6480 0.6480 
Poland 0.3950 0.9730 0.8450 0. 7830 
Portugal 0.3030 0.8270 0.8090 0.5990 
Qatar 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Romania 0.4710 0.7520 0.5400 0.4350 
Russian Federation 0.5390 0.9710 0.5090 0.4900 
Rwanda 0.2790 0.2860 0.2860 0.2860 
Saudi Arabia 0.5710 0.5770 0.5770 0.5770 
Senegal 0.3820 0.3990 0.3990 0.3990 
Serbia 0.2880 0.6800 0.6400 0.4600 
Sierra Leone 0.2020 0.2740 0.2740 0.2740 
Singapore 0.7850 1.0000 1.0000 0.6950 
Slovak Republic 0.3920 1.0000 1.0000 0.6700 
Slovenia 0.3370 1.0000 0.7440 0.7660 
South Africa 0.2770 0.2950 0.2950 0.2950 
Spain 0.3230 0.9950 0.9470 0.9200 
Sri Lanka 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Swaziland 0.3240 0.3690 0.3690 0.3690 
Sweden 0.2960 1.0000 0.8090 0.7420 
Switzerland 0.2750 1.0000 1.0000 0.9630 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.6720 0.6730 0.6720 0.6720 
Tajikistan 0.5410 1.0000 0.4860 0.4860 
Tanzania 0.4670 1.0000 1.0000 0.4610 
Thailand 0.5820 0.8260 0.5670 0.5610 
Timor-Leste 0.1520 0.1590 0.1590 0.1590 
Togo 0.3650 0.4050 0.4050 0.4050 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.5720 1.0000 1.0000 0.5100 
Tunisia 0.3640 0.8170 0.7650 0.3600 
Turkey 0.4390 0.6280 0.5540 0.4140 
Uganda 0.3550 0.3600 0.3600 0.3600 
Ukraine 0.3920 0.7860 0.6570 0.3470 
United Arab Emirates 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
United Kingdom 0.3270 1.0000 1.0000 0.9400 
United States 0.2420 1.0000 0.7190 0.6790 
Uruguay 0.4210 1.0000 0.7340 0.7110 
Uzbekistan 0.5320 0.8530 0.4830 0.4830 
Venezuela, RB 0.4660 0.6340 0.4860 0.4480 
Vietnam 0.3310 0.3340 0.3300 0.3300 
Yemen, Rep. 0.3920 0.4310 0.4310 0.4310 
Zambia 0.7370 0.7550 0.7550 0.7550 
APPENDIX2 
EXAMPLE OF REDUCTION IN INDEPENDENTLY EFFICIENT DMUS RESULTING 
FROM ELIMINATION OF ONE OUTPUT VARIABLE 
Albania 0.866 France 0.871 
Algeria 0.568 Gabon 0.932 
Angola 0.71 Gambia, The 0.561 
Argentina 0.853 Georgia 0.633 
Armenia 0.655 Germany 1 
Australia 1 Ghana 0.31 
Austria 0.797 Greece 0.871 
Azerbaijan 0.624 Guatemala 0.388 
Bangladesh 0.722 Guinea 0.489 
Belarus 0.991 Honduras 0.617 
Belgium 0.726 Hungary 0.83 
Benin 0.57 Iceland 1 
Bolivia 0.484 India 0.572 
Botswana 0.291 Indonesia 1 
Brazil 0.392 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1 
Bulgaria 0.671 Ireland 0.97 
Burkina Faso 0.4 Israel 0.79 
Burundi 0.41 Italy 0.937 
Cambodia 0.537 Jamaica 0.658 
Cameroon 0.454 Japan 1 
Canada 1 Jordan 0.48 
Central African Republic 0.851 Kazakhstan 0.924 
Chad 0.391 Kenya 0.482 
Chile Korea, Rep. 1 
China 0.861 Kuwait 
Colombia 0.432 Kyrgyz Republic 0.397 
Congo, Rep. 0.881 LaoPDR 0.618 
Costa Rica 0.918 Latvia 1 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.434 Lebanon 1 
Croatia 0.992 Lesotho 0.268 
Cuba 0.625 Liberia 0.38 
Czech Republic 0.917 Lithuania 0.976 
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Denmark 0.685 Luxembourg 
Dominican Republic 0.938 Macedonia, FYR 0.87 
Ecuador 0.832 Madagascar 0.863 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.492 Malawi 0.373 
El Salvador 0.408 Malaysia 0.805 
Estonia 1 Mali 0.421 
Ethiopia 0.504 Mauritania 0.782 
Finland 0.837 
Mauritius 0.677 Slovak Republic 1 
Mexico 1 Slovenia 0.869 
Moldova 0.267 South Africa 0.295 
Mongolia 0.928 Spain 0.995 
Morocco 0.425 Sri Lanka 
Mozambique 0.483 Swaziland 0.369 
Namibia 0.336 Sweden 
Netherlands 0.977 Switzerland 1 
New Zealand 0.896 Syrian Arab Republic 0.673 
Nicaragua 0.358 Tajikistan 0.486 
Niger 0.406 Tanzania 1 
Nigeria 0.751 Thailand 0.648 
Norway Timor-Leste 0.159 
Oman Togo 0.405 
Pakistan 0.863 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Panama 0.498 Tunisia 0.817 
Paraguay 0.426 Turkey 0.628 
Peru 0.549 Uganda 0.36 
Philippines 0.648 Ukraine 0.666 
Poland 0.909 United Arab Emirates 
Portugal 0.827 United Kingdom 1 
Qatar 1 United States 0.876 
Romania 0.54 Uruguay 0.829 
Russian Federation 0.509 Uzbekistan 0.483 
Rwanda 0.286 Venezuela, RB 0.486 
Saudi Arabia 0.577 Vietnam 0.33 
Senegal 0.399 Yemen, Rep. 0.431 
Serbia 0.68 Zambia 0.755 
Sierra Leone 0.274 
Singapore 1 
APPENDIX3 
WELFARE STATE OUTPUT INDICATOR FOR MODEL SPECIFICATION D 
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16 Welfare state Output indicator is calculated in a manner similar to the United Nations' 
Human Development Indicator HDI. Based on values in Appendix 1 "Countries and Variables 
Included in the Study", the welfare state output variables are normalized across variables and 
averaged across country, so that the i-th output variable x* for country n is normalized as 
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I. 
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and averaged into a Welfare State Output Indicator WSOI for country I as 
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APPENDIX4 
SPECIFICATION B VRS EFFICIENCY SCORES (N=137) 
Country Efficiency Score Scale Efficiency 
Dubai (UAE) 1 1 
Kuwait 1 1 
Oman 1 1 
Qatar 1 1 
Sri Lanka 1 
Indonesia 0.973 
Albania 0.814 
Singapore 1 0.785 
Annenia 1 0.691 
Kazakhstan 1 0.69 
Azerbaijan 1 0.627 
Lebanon 1 0.626 
Mongolia 0.595 
Trinidad and Tobago 1 0.572 
Tajikistan 1 0.541 
Belarus 0.477 
Macedonia, FYR 1 0.475 
Tanzania 1 0.467 
Estonia 1 0.445 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1 0.431 
Lithuania 0.422 
Uruguay 0.421 
Latvia 0.419 
Mexico 0.413 
Korea, Rep. 0.411 
Czech Republic 0.403 
Luxembourg 0.396 
Chile 0.393 
Georgia 0.392 
Slovak Republic 0.392 
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Japan 1 0.376 
Croatia 1 0.37 
Australia 0.351 
Slovenia 0.337 
United Kingdom 0.327 
Finland 0.318 
Norway 1 0.316 
Germany 0.307 
Canada 0.303 
Sweden 0.296 
Iceland 1 0.292 
Costa Rica 1 0.285 
Switzerland 1 0.275 
United States 0.242 
Cuba 0.207 
Ireland 0.996 0.332 
Spain 0.995 0.325 
Netherlands 0.977 0.306 
Poland 0.973 0.406 
Russian Federation 0.971 0.555 
Ecuador 0.952 0.829 
Argentina 0.944 0.354 
Dominican Republic 0.938 0.593 
Italy 0.937 0.354 
Gabon 0.932 0.956 
New Zealand 0.913 0.317 
Bulgaria 0.882 0.434 
Congo, Rep. 0.881 0.948 
Hungary 0.871 0.432 
Greece 0.871 0.37 
France 0.871 0.304 
Pakistan 0.863 0.913 
Madagascar 0.863 0.641 
China (China-Shanghai) 0.861 0.723 
Uzbekistan 0.853 0.624 
Central African Repub. 0.851 0.833 
Israel 0.844 0.404 
Portugal 0.827 0.366 
Thailand 0.826 0.705 
Tunisia 0.817 0.446 
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Malaysia 0.805 0.708 
Austria 0.797 0.352 
Ukraine 0.786 0.499 
Mauritania 0.782 0.886 
Philippines 0.766 0.874 
Zambia 0.755 0.976 
Paraguay 0.755 0.564 
Romania 0.752 0.627 
Nigeria 0.751 0.816 
Panama 0.742 0.48 
Belgium 0.726 0.356 
Bangladesh 0.722 0.94 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.719 0.603 
Angola 0.71 0.747 
Denmark 0.693 0.395 
Serbia 0.68 0.423 
Mauritius 0.677 0.707 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.673 0.999 
Jamaica 0.658 0.761 
Venezuela, RB 0.634 0.736 
Turkey 0.628 0.7 
Lao PDR 0.618 0.933 
Honduras 0.617 0.984 
Moldova 0.617 0.39 
Saudi Arabia 0.577 0.989 
India 0.572 0.934 
Benin 0.57 0.944 
Algeria 0.568 0.805 
Gambia, The 0.561 0.954 
Peru 0.549 0.989 
Cambodia 0.537 0.927 
Colombia 0.518 0.806 
Ethiopia 0.504 0.887 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.492 0.99 
Jordan 0.492 0.584 
Guinea 0.489 0.846 
Bolivia 0.484 0.959 
Mozambique 0.483 0.908 
Kenya 0.482 0.891 
Cameroon 0.454 0.898 
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Cote d'Ivoire 0.434 0.882 
Yemen, Rep. 0.431 0.909 
Morocco 0.425 0.976 
Mali 0.421 0.791 
Burundi 0.41 0.462 
El Salvador 0.408 0.984 
Niger 0.406 0.754 
Togo 0.405 0.902 
Burkina Faso 0.4 0.804 
Senegal 0.399 0.957 
Brazil 0.392 0.784 
Chad 0.391 0.797 
Guatemala 0.388 0.981 
Liberia 0.38 0.774 
Malawi 0.373 0.927 
Swaziland 0.369 0.878 
Uganda 0.36 0.986 
Nicaragua 0.358 0.974 
Namibia 0.336 0.949 
Vietnam 0.334 0.993 
Ghana 0.31 0.917 
South Africa 0.295 0.939 
Botswana 0.291 0.95 
Rwanda 0.286 0.973 
Sierra Leone 0.274 0.736 
Lesotho 0.268 0.891 
Timor-Leste 0.159 0.956 
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